Performance-Based Quality Contracts for the Bus Sector: Delivering Social and Commercial Value for Money by Hensher, David A. & Houghton, Erne
  
 
INSTITUTE OF  
TRANSPORT STUDIES 
The Australian Key Centre  
in Transport Management 
 
The University of Sydney 
and Monash University 
Established under the Australian Research Council’s Key Centre Program. 
 
WORKING PAPER 
ITS-WP-02-16 
 
 
 
Performance-Based Quality 
Contracts for the Bus 
Sector:  Delivering Social 
and Commercial Value for 
Money 
 
 
By 
 
David A Hensher and Erne Houghton 
 
September, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1440-3501 
 
 
NUMBER: Working Paper ITS-WP-02-16 
TITLE: Performance-Based Quality Contracts for the Bus Sector: 
Delivering Social and Commercial Value for Money 
 
ABSTRACT: Reform of the bus sector has been occurring in many countries. 
One matter central to these reform initiatives is the 
establishment of a value for money (VM) regime to ensure that 
operators deliver to the market the best possible service levels 
consistent with stakeholder needs and especially the objectives 
of government. A key underlying feature of ‘value for money’ 
(VM) is identifying the benefit to society associated with each 
dollar of subsidy support from government. This paper reviews 
the elements of a VM regime within the setting of an incentive-
based performance contract and develops a formal framework 
for establishing optimum subsidy based on system-wide 
maximisation of social surplus. The maximisation of social 
surplus is subject to a number of constraints including the 
commercial imperative of the operator, minimum service levels 
under community service obligations and a fare and subsidy 
budget cap. An important feature of the performance-based 
contract (PBC) regime is a passenger trip-based incentive 
payment scheme linked to user and environmental externality 
benefits incorporating a subsidy per additional passenger trip 
above the patronage delivered under minimum service and fare 
levels. In this way, rewards to operators are revealed through 
the fare box, through increased consumer surplus and through 
reductions in negative externalities associated with car use. 
PBCs can be designed to accommodate both transition from an 
existing regime and post-transition growth strategies. The 
implementation of performance-based contracts is illustrated 
using data from private operators in the Sydney Metropolitan 
Area.  
 
KEY WORDS: Contracts, Bus Reform, Value for Money, Performance, 
Optimum Subsidy and Multiple Objectives. 
 
AUTHORS: David A Hensher and Erne Houghton 
 
CONTACT: Institute of Transport Studies (Sydney & Monash) 
 The Australian Key Centre in Transport Management, C37 
 The University of Sydney  NSW  2006, Australia 
 
 Telephone: +61 9351 0071 
 Facsimile: +61 9351 0088 
 Email: itsinfo@its.usyd.edu.au 
 Internet: http://www.its.usyd.edu.au 
 
DATE: September 2002 
Performance-Based Quality Contracts for the Bus Sector:  Delivering Social and Commercial Value 
for Money 
Hensher & Houghton 
1 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the recent period of significant change in the way that bus services are supplied in 
many countries, a key focus has been the delivery of cost efficient services (through 
mixtures of privatisation, economic deregulation and competitive tendering) and finding 
ways to grow patronage (Hensher 2002a). Despite all the developments to improve the 
cost and service efficiency of operations, something has often been shown to be lacking 
– the global picture which recognises that public transport is, above all, provided 
through a supply chain in which different objectives apply such as commercial and 
social obligations. This broad and more holistic approach presented in Hensher and 
Macario (2002) recognises that no institution is able to act without affecting the other 
agents in the system.  Social surplus maximisation (SSM) principles applied to transport 
tend to suffer when the focus is narrowed to the detail of cost efficient operations (the 
dominating focus in recent years of competitive tendering), losing to a growing extent 
the SSM aim associated with an overall mobility system.  A big challenge is to re-focus 
on the integration of SSM and commercial objectives in a way that delivers much 
improved service levels as part of what might be generically termed a value for money 
objective function.  The holistic vision is to pursue social planning with a commitment 
to commercial objectives and opportunities at the operational level under a cost and 
service efficiency regime, thereby recognising the real meaning of optimum subsidy. 
This theoretical approach is not new and was articulated in the public transport context 
over 18 years ago by Jansson (1984), and more recently by Jansson (2001)1.  
 
As part of the many reviews of the contracting regimes that bus businesses operate 
within, it has been recognised that the relationship between commercial and social 
objectives has not been investigated in a systematic manner. To what extent are existing 
subsidy support levels optimal? What exactly does this mean? One issue of interest to 
many governments is growing bus patronage that in particular switches from the car and 
hence reduces the negative environmental impacts of transport (Hensher 2002a).  Thus 
an important task in the review of a service delivery regime is the establishment of an 
optimum system-wide subsidy system for the provision of bus services such that a profit 
maximisation level of passenger trip activity on the part of the operator will coincide 
with social surplus maximisation objectives. Economists when integrating these two 
maximisation objectives refer to social surplus (SS) maximisation as the sum of 
producer surplus (PS) (maximisation) and consumer surplus (CS) (maximisation). The 
former is equivalent (under a cost-efficiency regime) to profit maximisation for private 
bus operators. In most cost-benefit analyses undertaken by the public sector, there has 
been an almost total focus on consumer surplus maximisation, defining net benefit as 
the difference between consumer surplus in the presence and absence of a policy 
                                                           
1 Jan Owen Jansson in his plenary paper at the 7th International Conference on Competition and 
Ownership of Land Passenger Transport (Jansson 2001) states: 
 
“Two main possibilities for improvement [in cost efficiency] are to stimulate competition, and to 
enhance the motivation and creativity of operators by introducing the profit motive into a 
traditional ‘public service’. The question is, if the present allocative inefficiency in transport 
markets will be improved in the process, it is argued that these changes will not be brought about 
by the increased reliance on market forces. On the contrary, better planning of public transport 
systems, and, I dare say, continued or increased subsidization are two necessary conditions for 
realizing the potential improvement of the resource allocation. A complementary, significant 
point is, however, that there is no inevitable conflict between the ambition to increase cost 
efficiency in public transport, and a transport policy towards an efficient modal split.” 
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instrument (typically measured by changes in generalised cost). Yet it is the sum of PS 
and CS that represents the overall benefit to society. Thus failure to take into account 
the operator’s objective function is a failure to recognise social optimality.  
 
One of the most innovative payment schemes designed to secure socially optimum 
behavioural responses from transport operators has been developed in Norway for 
application in Hordaland County2. The local government makes payments to the bus 
operators through an incentive scheme that “pays for results rather than shares the costs 
of inputs” (Carlquist 2001)3. The approach identifies a set of ‘external’ effects that are 
typically not taken into account by the individual traveller when choosing a transport 
mode.4  Hensher and Stanley (2002) provide more details on this scheme as well as 
other approaches to the establishment of performance-based contracts. 
 
When a traveller chooses to go by car, the decision-maker ignores the external costs 
imposed on others (eg. the costs of congestion, accident risk and pollution) – assuming 
(as usual) that the institutional context does not allow the deployment of (first-best) car-
user charges to reflect these costs. Conversely, an extra traveller who goes by bus (or 
other public transport) helps to create a positive external effect – often called the 
Mohring effect: as patronage increases on a route (or in a particular area), the (socially) 
optimum service frequency also increases. This benefits the new travellers (whose 
patronage has led to the service improvement), and also reduces trip time for those 
others who continue to use the service. 
 
In the absence of practicable price discrimination, the operator is not able to extract the 
increase in consumer surplus that is enjoyed by the continuing users as a result of the 
increase in frequency – because a fare increase for all passengers would preclude some 
or all of the extra travel that justifies and requires the extra frequency. To achieve the 
optimum service level, a government-funded incentive payment is needed. To the extent 
that the incentive payments result in lower fares and/or improved service levels, there 
can be social benefit from increased travel (that is, generated trips) as well as from the 
reduction in car travel. This too should be recognised in establishing the incentive 
payments. 
 
The apparent conflict between the operator’s objective function and that of SS 
maximisation is primarily related to the absence of the use of benchmarked best practice 
costing and the presence of externalities linked to environmental (eg congestion, 
pollution) and social (eg equity) impacts that are not internalised in the operator’s profit 
and loss account. If SS maximisation imposes a substantial financial loss on the 
operator it would be unacceptable to the operator. If however a positive change in CS 
(based on private user benefits) and non-internalised environmental externality benefits 
(EB)5 would increase revenue (and conversely decrease revenue for a negative change 
in CS and EB), the operator would have the necessary incentive to act as a social 
surplus maximiser. The question then becomes one of identifying how this incentive can 
                                                           
2 An area that includes the city of Bergen as well as some surrounding rural areas. 
3 Competitive tendering as implemented, in contrast, has mainly focussed on sharing the costs of inputs. 
4 Although the principal modal choice in the Hordaland context is between bus and car, the competition 
can be generalised to include rail, ferry etc. 
5 Strictly, consumer surplus (CS) is the sum of private user benefits (UB) and (internalised) 
environmental benefits (EB), but herein we treat them as separate benefit sources, referring to private user 
benefits as consumer surplus.  
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be provided in practice. The implementation ‘solution’ appears to lie in changes to the 
pricing (ie fare) and/or supply regulations in a way that opens up opportunities for the 
operator and the regulator (the latter acting on behalf of the government) to seek out 
incentive-based mechanisms that reflect the challenge to internalise CS and EB6. This 
should hopefully provide the necessary freedom and (positive) incentives for the 
operator to pro-actively participate in pricing policy and service design to increase cost 
efficiency as well as allocative efficiency. The benchmark for progress however is 
internalisation of CS and EB, achieved by the mix of internalised cost recovery and 
externalised funding by the provision of an optimum subsidy (or incentive-payment).   
 
What formula will work in practice that is acceptable to both the operator and the 
regulator? One thing is almost certain - there will need to be a transparent level of 
external subsidy7.  If a scheme is to work, however, it must prevent cost inefficiency 
(which can be a product of subsidy support, as indeed can poor service delivery). An 
effective monitoring and benchmarking program is critical8 to ensure that cost 
inefficiency does not occur as the subsidy is introduced to support initiatives that deliver 
consumer surplus, and that external funding delivers the best value for money.  
Periodically reviewed benchmark best cost practice associated with specific 
geographical settings should be the basis of subsidy determination. 
 
The following sections of the paper review the elements of a VM regime within the 
setting of an incentive-based performance contract and develops a formal (economic) 
framework for establishing an optimum subsidy based on maximisation of social 
surplus. The maximisation of social surplus is subject to a number of constraints 
including the commercial imperative of the operator, minimum service levels and a fare 
and subsidy budget cap. An important feature of the performance-based quality contract 
regime is a passenger-based incentive payment scheme incorporating a subsidy per 
additional passenger trip above that patronage delivered under minimum service and 
fare levels. In this way, rewards to operators are revealed through the fare box, through 
increased consumer surplus and through reductions in negative externalities associated 
with car use. The implementation of performance-based contracts is illustrated using 
data collected in 2002 from private operators in the Sydney Metropolitan Area. 
Appendix A summarises the main elements of a PBS transitional scheme for Sydney. 
PBCs can be designed to accommodate both transition from an existing regime and 
post-transition growth strategies. 
                                                           
6 It must also be recognised that the delivery of positive CS under a subsidy-scheme recognises the 
presence of under-pricing of competing modes such as the car. Subsidies to public transport are designed 
to bring its operation into line with social considerations. In particular, when car users are not charged for 
the negative externalities that arise from their car use, subsidies for bus services can help to encourage 
travellers to make appropriate choices between travel modes. Yet, when privatisation and contracting-out 
of bus services came into vogue in the mid-1980s, the principal aims were simply to reduce subsidies and 
to increase cost efficiency. In recent years, the focus has turned to the shaping of payment instruments to 
try to secure behavioural responses that support the specific policy purposes of the government 
instrumentality that pays the subsidy.  
7 This is separate from any operator commitment to internal cross-subsidy between various activities that 
is consistent with efficiency objectives provided that avoidable costs are covered on each (well-defined) 
activity. 
8 We recognise that monitoring of performance cannot be precise and must be dependent on trust and 
quality reporting (Carlquist 2001). Such a monitoring program should focus on the three dimensions of 
overall performance:  cost efficiency, cost effectiveness and service effectiveness. The role of constructs 
such as a Service Quality Index (SQI) developed by Hensher and his colleagues (eg Prioni and Hensher 
2000, Hensher and Prioni 2002, Hensher et al 2002) offers one way of tracking the last dimension.  
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2. Incentive-Based Performance Contracts 
 
Before setting out the formal economic framework for a proposed performance-based 
contract regime (for Australia), we will take a closer look at a recent initiative in 
Norway that promotes the PBC regime over competitive tendering9. New performance 
contracts were established, in early 2000, for the three bus operators in the Hordaland 
county. One of these serves the urban area; the other two operate in rural areas and on 
the main corridors into Bergen. There is little or no on-the-road competition. 
 
The design of the Hordaland payment mechanism is innovative. Larsen and his 
colleagues (Larsen 2001, Johansen et al 2001) develop a two stage procedure where the 
first stage determines fare levels, bus revenue-km and bus capacities to maximise a 
social welfare function (essentially SS maximisation). The second stage calculates rates 
for fare subsidies, and for revenue-km subsidies (applicable in the peak and/or periods), 
that will induce a profit-maximising operator to choose the (socially) optimum levels for 
revenue-km and for bus capacities. This statement in italics is the essence of the 
approach providing the link between commercial and social objectives. The operator 
does not set fare levels but complies with maximum fare levels set by the authority. The 
per-passenger remuneration received by the operator is the sum of the fare level 
(determined in the first-stage welfare-maximising calculation) and the subsidy level 
(determined in the second-stage calculation). 
 
In this approach, a per-passenger subsidy, or fare subsidy ‘pays for results’ and the 
revenue-km payment reimburses some of the costs. The operator also receives the fare 
revenue and both kinds of revenue together provide the operator with sufficient income 
to balance the operating costs. In other words, the revenue-km subsidy will not 
encourage an operator to run empty vehicles. It does encourage service frequency and 
the extent of the induced increase in frequency depends on how vigorously (and 
successfully) the operator pursues profits. What we have here is an incentive-based 
performance contract where the subsidy is set to match the sum of the avoided external 
costs of car use and the benefits of increased service frequency.   
 
The welfare outcomes depend on the details of the implementation. The implementation 
of the Hordaland model is described in Carlquist (2001)10. Each operator has a 
separately calibrated contract. As in earlier contracts, these are on a net-cost basis; but 
unlike the Larsen (2001) model, each operator may determine the fare levels. In the 
                                                           
9 The evidence is drawn from Carlquist (2001), Larsen (2001), Johansen et al (2001), Mills and Gale 
(2002). Hensher and Stanley (2002) provide further details of the Norwegian model and the arguments for 
PBC compared to Competitive Tendering.  
10 As an example of the subsidy calculation, using vehicle kilometres (VKM) as the performance criterion 
and $/vkm as the cost rate (RATE), with the subsidy subject to a maximum predetermined level, the 
subsidy in year t = (RATE*VKMt) minus a fixed deduction as explained in Larsen (2001). Profits are co-
determined by different performance-based items – ticket revenues (I), subsidies (S), and costs (C). Ticket 
revenue is equal to fare (F) multiplied by demand (D), and demand is a function of VKM, fares and other 
service attributes.  That is: profits=I+S-C, C=f(VKM), I=F*X and X=g(VKM,F,…). Given the right 
incentive (ie RATE) the operator will decide on a fare level and VKM at a level that maximises profits 
and maximises social welfare given the budgetary limits for subsidy support. The budgetary limit is often 
associated with a constrained social welfare maximisation rule (or Ramsey rule) that implicitly imposes a 
marginal cost of government funds on the calculation (ie the amount that government is willing and 
possibly able to contribute to the social welfare objective).  
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event, the implemented contracts do not include any per-passenger subsidy, in part 
because the (global) budget constraint limited the amounts of subsidy that could be 
paid11. The Larsen modelling had suggested such subsidy should be paid, but only 
where the fare was significantly less than the marginal cost – as for peak-period rural 
services. The revenue-km subsidy has been implemented through two components – one 
subsidy rate per vehicle-km and another per vehicle-hour, to accommodate differences 
between congested urban conditions and non-congested rural operation. 
 
The subsidy rates are calculated to secure optimum marginal conditions. In principle, 
there is no certainty that the total amount of subsidy will be such as to enable the 
operator to receive as much as, and no more than, a reasonable return on investment. 
Numerical calculations prepared by Larsen show that the urban operator (in particular) 
would be likely to receive a substantial level of excess profit. This arises because the 
marginal cost of the peak services is very much higher than the cost of the other 
(‘basic’) services, which are a substantial part of the total offering. Accordingly, a ‘fixed 
deduction’ was suggested. Being fixed in total amount, this has no effect on the 
(marginal) incentive structure. Carlquist reports that the fixed-deduction principle was 
incorporated in the implemented contracts. 
 
In the first year (2001) of the deployment of the new performance contracts, there has 
been little change (especially in regard to route networks) – in part because the budget 
constraint was tight enough to limit the scope for change, and in part (perhaps) because 
of inertia, including political resistance to change. Nevertheless Carlquist (2001) 
reported that experience with the new contracts is generally well regarded. 
 
The Hordaland model has provided the starting position for the authors’ proposal for a 
PBC framework for Australia. The data used to illustrate the implementation of a PBC 
regime has been obtained from a major private operator who is widely regarded as 
operating at best practice with respect to cost efficiency and effectiveness. Thus the 
approach detailed below is indicative of the outcomes one might anticipate under a PBC 
regime for an outer urban area bus operator in a major city in Australia. We focus on a 
PBC scheme under a transition from the existing contract regime but show that once the 
transition is complete, the very same PBC scheme can be used to promote growth in 
passenger trips through improved service levels supported by incentive payments 
(Hensher and Houghton (in progress)). 
 
3. The Australian PBC Proposition  
 
The proposed PBC framework is based upon a model system that recognises the 
obligations of government, as well as the need to provide appropriate incentives to 
operators to service the market in line with value for money under a tight subsidy 
regime. In addition, we recognise the constraints under which the regulator charged with 
implementing and monitoring a contract regime operates. In NSW, for example, a 
                                                           
11 The global budget constraint is a very important parameter for the NSW government because it is at the 
heart of the Bus Reform agenda. The intent appears to be clear – to provide increased value for money 
within a system-wide pre-determined maximum budget. As detailed herein PBC’s can be developed for 
transition (holding existing subsidy levels fixed) and then later allow the subsidy level to vary as the 
reward for growing patronage. 
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paramount requirement is for a minimum12 administrative burden based on suitable 
reliable data provided by bus operators.  
 
The PBC framework is assumed to be implemented system-wide over a pre-defined 
geographical area (but can also be implemented for a single operator). We distinguish 
between metropolitan and non-metropolitan settings and focus herein on the 
metropolitan model. Furthermore we recognise intra-metropolitan differences in the 
operating environment, especially due to patronage catchment, traffic congestion and 
time of day. These differences are accommodated (to a large extent) by distinguishing 
between inner and outer metropolitan areas as well as peak and off-peak periods.  
Where minimum service levels (MSLs) are required, they will be set exogenously for 
each region and period based on a grading system determined (outside of the PBC 
structure) by a number of criteria including population, population density and 
incidence of school children13. All costs used will be assumed to be benchmarked best 
practice for the specific context. The use of benchmarked costs ensures that optimum 
subsidies are based on cost efficient service levels14.  
 
3.1 Defining Annual Passenger Demand 
The demand for bus travel (Y) is defined as one-way annual passenger trips15 per 
contract period, and is assumed to be influenced by fares (q) and service levels (X), 
where the latter is proxied by revenue vehicle kilometres (ie total vehicle kilometres 
minus dead running kilometres). Since the categories of bus passengers have differing 
degrees of behavioural responsiveness to changes in fares and service levels, separate 
passenger demand models are required for each segment. Within each geographical 
context, we initially propose separate demand models for peak and off-peak travel for 
two broad classes of travellers: (i) adults, (fare paying) children and concession 
travellers (ACC) and (ii) school children (S). Further segmentation can be introduced as 
required. There are many specifications available to represent travel demand. We have 
chosen equation form (1) for class (i) travellers and a separate equation form (2) for 
class (ii) travellers, where the latter applies when school children do not pay a fare. 
Before the implementation of the proposed scheme (base case B), demand levels, YB, are 
based on existing fares and service levels. After the implementation of the proposed 
scheme (Application case A), predicted demand, YA, is a function of a base demand (YB); 
the direct fare elasticity of demand and the direct revenue vehicle kilometre elasticity of 
demand; and operator responses to the scheme through changes to fares and revenue 
                                                           
12 And certainly no increase over existing regulatory resource commitments. 
13 Although we specify MSL in terms of a minimum amount of revenue vehicle kilometres, the regulator 
may wish to impose some very specific conditions on where and when these RVKM are to be provided 
within the contract area. This is not an issue of concern to establishing the appropriate level of incentive 
payment given a system-wide subsidy budget since all we need to know is the minimum RVKM for each 
of the peak and of-peak periods for each contract area. We have doubts about the benefit of imposing too 
rigid a service specification as is currently the situation in NSW because it results in many services with 
very little patronage and substantial cost-burdens that do not provide real benefits to society. Spreading 
thin resources thinly is not a virtue that we should promote. Larsen (2001, page 2) promotes a view that 
“…the design of a route system is best left to an operator familiar with the area to be served”. There are 
sensible reasons for moving from the tactical to operator level the fare structure, fare level, route 
networks and timetables within the parameters of the incentive-driven quality contract. 
14 If there is a case for differences in cost efficient rates (for whatever reason, such as an equity-
adjustment), this can be included. 
15 A passenger trip is defined as a single one-way trip from an origin to a destination. If a transfer between 
buses is required this is not two passenger trips. 
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vehicle kilometres. The elasticities used in equation (1) for each of peak and off-peak 
activity are weighted averages across the classes of travellers within the separate 
demand categories. 
 
( ) ( )*exp[ ( ) ( )]
q X
Y ACC Y ACCA B A B A B
ACC ACC B BY Y q q X Xq X
ε ε
= − + −     
  (1) 
( )*exp[ ( )]
X
Y SA B A B
S S BY Y X XX
ε
= −        
  (2) 
 
We initially assume a static representation with the annual patronage response assumed 
to occur at the specified rate over the period of a contract. For class (i) travellers, the set 
of fare elasticities is respectively -.20 and -.45 for the peak and off-peak periods, and the 
service (RVKM) elasticities are 0.33 and 0.63. For class (ii) travellers, the service 
elasticities are assumed to be the same as class (i), on the assumption that the parent 
traveller decides on the school child’s modal activity.  
 
The PBC system requires a base prediction of patronage associated with minimum 
service levels16. To obtain this patronage we use the level of RVKM associated with 
MSL and impose a fare level unchanged from case B. The resulting MSL patronage for 
class (i) travellers is YB in (3). 
 
( )*exp[ ( )]
X
Y ACCMSL B MSL B
ACC ACC BY Y X XX
ε
= −  (3)  
  
In what follows YA, YB, YMSL will be used in place of ( )A AACC SY Y+ . 
   
3.2 Defining Annual Total Cost 
Benchmark cost efficiency is formalised by a set of total annual cost equations (4) for 
each period and region. Total predicted cost (C) is defined as a function of benchmarked 
base cost (calculated from best practice total cost per kilometre); predicted responses in 
total vehicle kilometres (VKM) (including dead running kilometres), predicted changes 
in total passenger demand (from equations 1 and 2), predicted responses in total seat 
capacity per revenue vehicle kilometre; and the respective set of cost elasticities for 
VKM, patronage and bus capacity. VKM is the sum of revenue and dead running 
kilometres with the default value in our empirical example for dead running VKM set 
equal to12.5% of VKM for both peak and off-peak activity (That is, VKM = 
1.1258RVKM). Bus capacity (defined by seating and standing capacity per bus 
multiplied by the number of buses) impacts on passenger demand through revenue 
vehicle kilometres through a service quality constraint that indicates how much bus 
capacity must be provided to satisfy passenger trip demand. This then translates into 
vehicle kilometres which impacts on total annual cost, and takes into account the 
annualised cost of bus capital. The starting passenger trip-demand elasticities of cost are 
respectively -0.32 and -0.20 for the peak and off-peak periods. The equivalent service 
                                                           
16 An MSL is not a necessary input into the determination of a PBC but we include it as a specific input 
given that the regulator may require its inclusion. In section 4 we will show what the implications are for 
determining the maximum social surplus solution when there is no MSL.  
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(RVKM) elasticities are 0.76 and 1.20; and the equivalent fleet size elasticity, which is 
derived from increased capital charges and applies only to peak periods, is 0.19. The 
separate cost equation for peak and off-peak periods, for each region and period, has the 
form of (4). 
   
 
( ) ( ) #
*exp[ ( ) ( ) ( ) (# # )]
#
X Y ACC Y S bus
A B A B A B A B A BC C C C
ACC ACC S SB B B B
ACC S
C C VKM VKM Y Y Y Y bus bus
VKM Y Y bus
ε ε ε ε
= − + − + − + −  (4) 
 
 3.3 Defining the Constraints  
There are a number of constraints that enable us to represent the environment in which 
the delivery of services satisfies all stakeholders. The key constraints are shown below. 
 
3.3.1 Fare Cap 
 
A fare cap (5) over the contract period for each peak/off-peak period and region is a 
political reality in most jurisdictions and in Australia (maximum) fares typically may 
not increase by more than the consumer price index. The introduction of performance-
based contracts must comply with this condition, set as a 5% maximum increase per 
annum. This can be adjusted to suit the political setting. 
 
 
                                                         qA – 1.05qB ≤ 0 (5) 
 
3.3.2 Vehicle Kilometres (VKM) 
 
A condition of public transport service delivery often included in contracts is that there 
is a minimum level of service that must be provided under community service 
obligations (CSO) at cost efficient levels. These service levels are determined by 
external criteria set by government such as a requirement to provide a minimum amount 
of vehicle kilometres depending on the socio-economic and demographic profile of the 
region to be served. This profile must be defined by an agreed set of criteria such as 
total resident population, population density (1000’s of people per square kilometre), 
the percentage of total population that are school children and availability of other 
modes (eg a train service) (see Ton and Hensher 1997). On the basis of a weighted 
system for each criterion, a minimum amount of RVKM is required for each period and 
region. The precise geographical allocation of this MSL is a detail of specific contract 
compliance and has no impact on the determination of the optimal social solution. This 
minimum RVKM would ideally be an absolute amount; but for the present application 
we define it as 67% of current service VKM’s17.  Condition (6) defines the minimum 
level of service (MSL). A total cost per kilometre can be introduced to convert this MSL 
to a dollar commitment from government. We assume $VKM = $2.60 in the peak and 
$2.30 in the off-peak (based on 2002 best practice costs in the private bus sector in 
Sydney in a setting where the operator retains all fare revenue).  
 
The proportion of the total subsidy budget (TB) allocated to performance-based 
contracts in the regulator’s scheme is denoted by R, which permits variations in the 
                                                           
17 This percentage is derived from the percentage of RVKM complying with MSL’s for the illustrative 
operating context from which the data is extracted. 
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structure of the subsidy scheme between MSL and above-MSL (or PBC) components. 
Since TB is the pure-MSL subsidy requirement as determined by CSO, the MSL of a 
given scheme is defined by the associated R value as CSO*(1-R)18.  The inclusion of R 
is very important since it enables us to assess the implications of various mixes of MSL 
and PBC service levels.  
 
XMSL = (0.67)VKM (1-R) A MSLX X≥  (6) 
 
In addition to the fare cap and MSL constraints, government typically has a limited 
budget to allocate to subsidy support for bus transport. This subsidy cap is assumed to 
be a system-wide constraint within the metropolitan area and applies to all inner and 
outer metropolitan bus operators19. The subsidy cap is exogenously given but adjustable 
by government decree and has to fund the CSO payments as well as payments directly 
linked to incentives for growing patronage. The passenger-based incentive payment 
scheme at the heart of PBC’s is made up of gains in consumer surplus and externality 
benefits, where the latter are primarily linked to reductions in traffic congestion due to 
reductions in car VKMs (see section 3.5.2). For every additional passenger trip above 
predicted patronage based on RVKMMSL and associated fares, the operator has the 
opportunity to secure revenue from three sources: (i) the fare box (ii) the change in 
consumer surplus as a measure of user benefit and (iii) the change in externality cost 
from reduced car VKM. The last two revenue streams are referred to as incentive 
payments (above fare revenue) and are part of the total budget commitment to the 
system as a whole by government. After committing CSO payments the balance of the 
total subsidy budget is available for such incentive payments (constraint (6)). While this 
residual amount is fixed, the estimate of its dollar value per passenger trip of the 
consumer surplus benefit will be determined by the maximisation of the social surplus 
function subject to the set of constraints. The dollar unit values of reductions in car 
VKM are exogenously supplied based on studies of the environmental cost of car use 
(see Bus Industry Confederation 2001 and Sansom et al 2002). If additional passenger 
trip growth over the predicted amount per contract period is exceeded it cannot be 
funded out of the available incentive payments unless government revises its total 
subsidy budget. Nonetheless, all additional fare revenue will be accrued by the 
operators. 
 
3.3.3 Traffic and capacity  
 
In peak and off peak periods the road traffic in which buses operate is vastly different, 
and to achieve a given RVKM in dense traffic requires the deployment of more buses 
compared to light traffic conditions. A direct measure of bus-utilisation (ie traffic) 
intensity in the period is given by ( .# )
B
B
B
pers busZ
X
= . Z defines capacity required per 
RVKM as determined from the RVKM achieved by the number of buses (# buses) 
allocated to the period in the base case. An increase in base traffic results in a reduction 
                                                           
18 Specifically, R controls the structure of the contract scheme. Defining %PBC= (1-R), $CSO*(1-R) 
gives the MSL component of the subsidy; and hence the subsidy applied to the performance incentive is 
TB-CSO*(1-R); and the RVKM required to meet the (reduced) CSO is VKM*.67*(1-R). 
19 This cap can be applied to specific locations if that is more politically palatable. For Example, in the 
Sydney metropolitan area the government may choose to treat the government operator (the inner area 
supplier) differently to the private (outer area) operators. In addition, government may wish to pre-assign 
a cap to each operator (which we would recommend in the transition phase but not in post-transition 
growth phase). 
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in XB and an increase in Z, which has the effect of increasing the capacity required, 
XAZB, for a given solution XA. Z is not a control parameter but simply reflects the traffic 
of the period in the base case.  
 
Imposing equivalent traffic conditions in equivalent periods (peak, off-peak) to the base 
case requires 
 
A BZ Z=  , or,  
( .# )AA
B
pers busX
Z
=  (7) 
where   
 # bus = the number of buses assigned to the period/region and is 
assumed to reflect the demand levels of the base period and may be changed with 
corresponding cost implications. The capital cost of extra buses is fixed to # bus unless 
included with Z 
 
Pers = bus capacity (seating + standing) assumed to be single-valued and unchanging 
 
From (7) the capacity required for a given solution XA is given by A BX Z . 
 
The number of buses may be increased or decreased to provide an upper bound to XA 
that is fixed by the number of buses assigned to the period, i.e.  
 
( .# )AA
B
pers busX
Z
≤  (8) 
For a given #bus value, the bound may be loosened by deteriorating service quality, as 
discussed above. Again, the environment provided by the single stage solution is 
consistent with a profitable operator strategy to achieve the maximum social surplus, 
although it does not guarantee the optimum solution will be achieved.  
 
3.3.4 Service quality  
 
Service quality is maintained through the service quality constraint, which in its 
fundamental form requires  
 
YA/XA ≤ YB/XB.  (9) 
 
This becomes very restrictive for low X solutions, since with XA decreasing from XB 
towards XMSL, YA declines towards YMSL, given by *exp[ ( )]
X
MSL B A BY
BY Y X XX
ε
= − , more 
slowly than XA is declining. At low service levels, however, it is realistic to allow a 
decline in service quality to reflect an interaction between the declining returns and 
declining price elasticity of demand as the volume of business declines. In general, it is 
important to loosen the form of (9) through a control variable,κ, which relates to how 
full the buses are allowed to be on average given normal operating practices. κ is a 
measure of service quality with respect to loading and allows the service level to slip. 
The less restrictive form of (9) is given in (10) 
 
A A AY Z Xκ≤  (10) 
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The starting value of κ is 
B
B B
Y
X Z
κ =  which measures the base trip-rate per unit carrying 
capacity allocated. κ can be adjusted up or down to control an increase or decrease in 
acceptable bus crowding levels, thereby providing decreased or increased service 
quality (loading). Where increased κ is not associated with a reduced volume of 
business it should result in increased costs to reflect a loss of goodwill. Solutions 
incorporating increased values of κ will define an environment within which operators 
may make normal profits whilst providing high social surplus solutions. As in the 
previous section, optimum operator strategies may take the industry in different 
directions.  
 
3.3.5 System Wide Constraints 
 
There are two system-wide constraints associated with all regional activity.  
 
3.3.5.1 Subsidy cap 
 
First we have the total subsidy cap (11) in which the amount of subsidy available for 
passenger incentive payments is less than or equal to the total allocated subsidy budget 
minus commitments to CSO payments.  
 
( )4 4
region, period region, period
$ (1 )P CS EB TB CSO R+ ≤ − −∑ ∑ for (CS+EB)>0 (11) 
 
Constraint (11) states that the patronage incentive must be less than or equal to the 
subsidy budget above CSO payments for all operators for (CS+EB)>0. Performance-
based contracts allow subsidy payments to be earned whenever (CS+EB) are positive. 
Negative payments are not part of the performance-based system and are excluded in 
the modelling. Since both CS and EB are measured from the MSL position, payments 
are excluded when (CS+EB)<0. Although the total CS + EB is realised to the benefit of 
the community, the regulator can exercise the option to pay all of the benefit to the 
operator or only a proportion. P is the payout rate defining the proportion of external 
benefits accrued by bus companies on achieved (CS+EB). This is an important issue 
since the incentive payment focus does not suggest that 100% of the benefit must be 
paid to the operator. Indeed distribution of the full social benefit to the operator may not 
be equitable and/or financially feasible. What is critical however is that the payment 
distribution ensures sufficient incentive for the operator to improve service levels in 
order to grow patronage. 
 
3.3.5.2 Commercial requirements 
 
Total cost (including an acceptable return on investment) to all operators delivering bus 
services must be covered by all sources of revenue (12). The commercial constraint 
(equation 12) requiring that operator costs do not exceed revenues may be implemented 
when only commercially viable solutions are considered. 
 
( )4 4
region, period region, period
+ ( ) $ (1 )A AACCC qY P CS EB CSO R − + ≤ − ∑ ∑  … for (CS+EB)>0 (12) 
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3.4 Defining the Objective Function  
The demand and cost models together with the constraint set condition the maximum 
value of the social surplus objective function, given in (13)20.  
Max:   
4
region, period
(1 )( ) $ (1 ) ($ (1 ) ( ))A AACCP CS EB qY C CSO R CSO R P CS EB + + + − + − − − + + ∑  
 … for (CS+EB)>0  (13) 
 
CS is the consumer surplus and EB is the environmental benefit, where both of these are 
calculated from and above YMSL; all other variables are as defined previously. The 
measure of consumer surplus is relatively complex and influenced by changes in 
demand.  
 
3.5 Defining the Benefit Sources  
3.5.1 Consumer surplus 
 
The minimum service level, MSL, corresponds to the CSO, and is defined by a 
minimum RVKM, (XMSL) and maximum fare charged under MSL (typically the 
maximum permissible fare). The corresponding patronage level, YMSL, is established 
from (1). YMSL establishes the base patronage above which consumer surplus is 
generated given the current subsidy scheme. We let CS denote the level of consumer 
surplus associated with patronage determined by XMSL and maximum fares.  
 
A composite demand variable, G, is a function of both fare level and RVKM. GMSL is 
determined equivalently to YMSL. Quantity demanded is related to bus travel attributes, 
some of which are desirable to the consumer, like RVKM, and others which are 
undesirable, like price. These attributes may be combined in a composite attribute 
measure, G, where  
 
MSL MSL MSLG kq Xλ= + ;  A A AG kq Xλ= + ;  
( ) ( )MSL A MSL A MSL AG G k q q X Xλ− = − + − . (14) 
and  k = -1 
  λ = Community preparedness-to-pay for 1 km increase in X.   
 
Deriving lambda is a challenge given the absence of empirical studies. However 
additional service levels can be approximated by improved service frequency. The 
TRESIS project (Hensher 2002) provides a willingness to pay for improvements in 
service frequency of $2.66 per passenger trip hour. Given an average speed in the peak 
period of 24 kph and an off-peak average speed of 30 kph, we can convert the frequency 
valuation into $0.11 per RVKM in the peak and $0.0886 per RVKM in the off-peak for 
class (i) travelers. For class (ii) travellers the rates are halved.   
 
A corresponding composite demand function gives YA as a function of GA etc., and 
consumer surplus is then measured as (15). 
 
                                                           
20 Eqn (13) adds P(CS+EB) and $CSO(1-R) to the social surplus expression as they constitute part of the 
producers surplus, and then they are both subtracted since they sum to the scheme cost. 
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0.5* ( )( )* [( ) ( ), 1,1]A A MSL MSL MSL A A A MSL MSLACC S ACC S ACC S ACC SCS ABS Y Y Y Y G G if Y Y Y Y= + − − − + < + −
  (15) 
      (CS between YMSL, YA) 
         [( )*( ) 0,A A MSL MSL A MSLACC S ACC Sif Y Y Y Y G G+ + − − − <     
  ( )( )* [( ) ( ), 1,1],0]MSL MSL MSL A A A MSL MSLACC S ACC S ACC SY Y G G if Y Y Y Y+ − + < + −  
      (CS to axis if negative slope) 
 
Given that increases in fares reduce CS and increases in RVKM increase CS, we have to 
be careful how we treat the two impacts in the determination of changes in consumer 
surplus. Effective demand results from a balance between q and X.  For given parameter 
values, k and λ, the slope of the composite demand function will be positive or negative 
depending on solution values, qA and XA. When the slope is negative, as shown in 
Figure A, a consumer surplus, GAABGMSL, is derived from a reduction in the composite 
trip attribute from GMSL to GA.  But, when the slope is positive, as shown in Figure B, a 
consumer surplus, ABC, is derived from an increase in the composite trip attribute from 
GMSL to GA.  
 
 
In both Figures A and B, consumer surplus derives from ABC, but this is 
supplemented by the addition of (GMSL-GA)(YMSL) in Figure A. When YMSL is high and 
(YA-YMSL) = 0, the supplement will induce the optimization to choose a marginal 
difference between YA and YMSL in order to achieve a negative slope and accrue the 
supplement. In the programming, therefore, the supplement is accrued only for (YA-
YMSL) significantly different from zero.  
 
3.5.2 Environmental Externality Benefit 
 
The change in environmental benefits associated with car use is defined by equation 
(16). We assume initially that on average every car trip switched to a bus trip reduces 
car use by 10 kilometres and that 40% (20%) of all switched trips by adults (by school, 
GMSL 
GA 
YMSL YA 
A 
B 
GMSL 
GA 
YMSL YA 
A 
B 
C 
C 
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function – negative slope 
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function – positive slope 
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children) are from car21. Any transfer of car trips to bus trips reduces road traffic 
congestion and creates an environmental benefit which also contributes to social 
surplus. EB denotes the environmental benefit generated by solution trips above YMSL 
and is directly comparable to CS.  
 
EB = $/(↓car user)*(↑passengers from car)      … for each region, period  
      = ($/VKMcar)*(av VKMcar) *(↑passengers from car) 
      = ($/VKMcar)*(10KM)* ( )A A MSL MSLACC S ACC SY Y Y Y+ − −  *(shift factor car-bus) 
      = ($/VKMcar)*(10KM)* ( )A A MSL MSLACC S ACC SY Y Y Y+ − −  *0.4 (16) 
 
The unit rate of environmental benefit per VKM travelled by class (i) travellers, is a 
composite sum of six externalities, summarised in Table 1 for peak and off-peak and 
inner and outer metropolitan contexts. The evidence is drawn from the Bus Industry 
Confederation (2001) submission to the Commonwealth fuel tax inquiry. It is broadly 
consistent with the UK evidence reported in Sansom et al (2002).  
 
TABLE 1 Environmental Externality Costs per VKM 
 
Peak Period Inner Outer 
Road damage 0.2 0.2 
Congestion 90 60 
Air pollution 1 0.5 
Climate change 1.3 0.9 
Noise 0.4 0.3 
Accidents 0.8 0.8 
Total 93.7 62.7 
   
Off-Peak Period Inner Outer 
Road damage 0.2 0.2 
Congestion 16 16 
Air pollution 0.5 0.2 
Climate change 0.9 0.6 
Noise 0.3 0.1 
Accidents 0.8 0.8 
Total 18.7 17.7 
 
The patronage incentive is the sum of CS and EB (in dollars)22. Importantly, although 
school children travel for free in most jurisdictions and the operators are compensated 
through CSO payments, additional trips by children will attract an incentive payment 
through increased consumer surplus, and for car switchers, through increased externality 
benefit. On the latter calculation we may have to impose an additional assumption as to 
whether the school child’s bus use results in a reduction in car VKM or not, since some 
trips may continue. 
 
 
                                                           
21 This assumption can be refined by an assessment of source of switchers in the first monitoring period 
of if other evidence is available. 
22 EB may be negative if passenger trips fall and they switch to car, although we are not proposing to tax 
the operator. 
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4.  A Case Study for the Outer Metropolitan Area of 
Sydney 
 
The formal economic optimisation framework presented in section 3 has been tested on 
operators in the outer areas of the Sydney metropolitan area. Drawing on data collected 
in 2002 by the Institute of Transport Studies (ITS), in cooperation with 12 private bus 
operators23, we have extracted the relevant data for the model system. Importantly, the 
amount of data required from operators is relatively small and manageable for the 
regulatory task. Benchmark costs are those of the most cost efficient operator in the set 
(who is also the best operator on cost efficiency in the ongoing benchmarking program 
of ITS).  
 
Exogenous indicators such as elasticities, unit externality cost rates, willingness to pay 
parameters, minimum service level VKM etc are provided from non-operator sources 
and can be modified as new information becomes available. We have selected what are 
regarded as best-knowledge estimates in this case study to illustrate the feasibility and 
appeal of the analytical relationships used to establish appropriate incentive payments 
for performance-based contracts under a social surplus maximisation (or value for 
money) subsidy scheme. In the current paper we focus on the transition-phase of 
introducing PBCs and set the ‘optimal’ subsidy budget to the existing operator-specific 
level. In a follow-up paper, Hensher and Houghton (in progress) generalise the approach 
to optimise the total subsidy budget under a ‘growth after transition’ schema.  
 
The XMSL level is determined exogenously to accommodate the demographics of the 
region and availability of other modes. For this case study, XMSL is set for illustrative 
purposes to XMSL = 0.67 of VKM . The value of the pure MSL subsidy, $CSO, is based 
on $2.60/VKM (peak) and $2.30 (off-peak), which gives $CSO= $9,884,429. The 
subsidy budget of the illustrative cost-efficient operator is set to $CSO for the pure-
MSL strategy. The approach permits the entire range of contracts, from a pure-MSL to a 
pure-PBC and all mixes between. If the MSL component of the regulator’s subsidy 
scheme is reduced by R% of $CSO, then XMSL is reduced by R% of 0.67VKM and the 
subsidy budget allocated to PBC is the difference between TB and R% of $CSO. A 
subsidy scheme incorporating a mix of MSL and performance-based contracts, with a 
relatively large MSL component and a relatively small PB component, is likely to be a 
politically acceptable first step into a PB contract regime, and is a specific interest of 
this paper. In particular we consider optimizing the structure of the scheme (starting 
with the existing 0.67VKM base and R=0) to establish what mix of MSL and above-
MSL (ie performance based) service levels deliver a better value for money outcome 
than the baseline (ie current) MSL situation. An initial parity is established between 
alternative scheme mixes by holding RVKM, average fare, number of buses, patronage 
and costs fixed at the case B levels under what we refer to as the ‘calibration for parity’ 
(Section 4.1). We then allow RVKM, fares, fleet size, patronage and costs to change in 
the search for an improved solution (Section 4.2).  
 
                                                           
23 We used the data from 12 operators to confirm benchmark best cost practice and then used other data 
from this operator as if they were the system-wide provider. This paper does not assume anything about 
the optimum number of contract areas or operators. This issue is detailed in Hensher (2002b). 
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The seven model parameters are shown in Table 2. Four parameters are available to the 
regulator to define the subsidy scheme; and the operators as a group have four 
parameters to establish operator strategy within the environment of the defined scheme.  
 
Table 2:  Model parameters 
 
Parameter type Parameter 
Regulator parameters 
Operator parameters 
 P, R, RVKM(MSL), fare cap 
 q, RVKM, κ, #bus 
 
4.1. Calibration for Parity 
 
Under a mixed scheme, the difference between TB and R% of $CSO is available to 
distribute a return to the operators for the consumer benefits generated by Y>YMSL. For a 
given total subsidy budget the pure-PBC scheme may be calibrated to achieve parity 
with the pure-MSL scheme, in the sense that a payout rate on (CS+EB) exhausts the 
subsidy and the optimum “standard” operator strategy is the base case B, where 
standard strategies preclude changes to #bus, service quality and fares. The pure-MSL 
outcome is given in Table 3. No calibration is required for the pure-MSL scheme which 
is defined by current regulator rates. 
 
 
Table 3:  Model outcome for the pure-MSL scheme 
 
Model 
soln X q #bus used C        
Y         
(ACC+S)
CS   
(ACC+S)
EB           
(ACC+S)
Y(MSL)    
(ACC+S) X(MSL) Funding
Retn on 
cost
P-O 1,986,429 1.44 70 2,916,035 4,083,932 4,289,576 532,368 3,781,614 1,523,475 TB 9,884,429
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% CS+EB PAY 0
OP-O 3,358,000 1.52 36 13,048,221 2,794,325 2,253,562 259,467 2,412,741 2,575,389 FARES 6,291,216
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 13.44% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% CSO 9,884,429
TOTAL 5,344,429 1.51 70 15,964,256 6,878,257 6,543,138 791,835 6,194,356 4,098,864 less op COST 15,964,256
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.74% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% prod surp 211,389 1.32%
TB 9,884,429 CS+EB 7,334,972
Y         
(S)
CS          
(S)          
EB           
(S)          
Y(MSL)    
(S) SS 7,546,361
P 2,432,928 1,819,764 225,846 2,252,828 less SS Cost 9,884,429
0.000000% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% net SS -2,338,067 -23.65%
221,220 92,881 10,694 191,011 TB undist 0
0.000000% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% CB PS %PS SS %SS
2,654,148 1,912,645 236,540 2,443,839 7,334,972 211,389 1.32% 7,546,361 -23.65%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.09% 0.00% 0.00% 4.94% -13.18%
Y         
(ACC)     
CS          
(ACC)       
EB           
(ACC)        
Y(MSL)    
(ACC)
1,651,004 2,469,812 306,522 1,528,786
0.00% 3.70% 0.00% 0.00%
2,573,105 2,160,680 248,773 2,221,731
0.00% 14.09% 0.00% 0.00%
4,224,109 4,630,493 555,295 3,750,517
0.00% 8.31% 0.00% 0.00%
 
For a patronage level corresponding to the optimum standard RVKM under the pure-
PBC scheme, Table 4 shows that (CS+EB) exceeds the total budget by a substantial 
financial sum and cannot be paid in total to the operator. However, we can apply a non-
negative payout rate, P<1, to (CS+EB) to distribute the reduced sum to the operator and 
ensure there is no subsidy blowout. P will vary with the proportionate PBC component 
(R) in the scheme. A payout rate of P=9.334436% gives the case B outcome for the 
pure PBC scheme, as shown in Table 4.  
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But there are many mixed regulator strategies between Pure-MSL and pure-PBC. The 
5%-PBC regulator strategy includes a payout rate of P=5.086524%, and the model 
outcome is shown in Table 5. Tables 4 and 5 show that all aspects of peak and off peak 
operator strategies are unchanged for the optimum outcomes under the pure-and-mixed 
PBC regulator strategy. It is clear that a mixed PBC scheme can always be found that 
provides an environment within which current best practice will lead to operator 
outcomes equivalent to the pure-MSL scheme, as summarised in Table 6, which shows 
the totals/averages of the optimum standard strategy. The case B operational strategies 
(X, q) and associated outcomes (Y, C) are optimum for the case B fleet size (#bus) and 
service quality level, fare increases below 5%, and the specified (R, P) values.  
 
Table 4:  Model outcome for the pure-PBC scheme 
 
Model soln X q #bus used C        Y         (ACC+S) CS   (ACC+S)
EB           
(ACC+S)
Y(MSL)      
(ACC+S) X(MSL) Funding Retn on cost
P-O 1,986,429 1.44 70 2,916,035 4,083,932 69,885,636 2,021,391 2,936,036 0 TB 9,884,429
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1563.38% 279.70% -22.36% -100.00% CS+EB PAY 9,884,429
OP-O 3,358,000 1.52 36 13,048,221 2,794,325 33,096,947 888,108 1,488,235 0 FARES 6,291,216
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1565.98% 242.28% -38.32% -100.00% CSO 0
TOTAL 5,344,429 1.51 70 15,964,256 6,878,257 102,982,583 2,909,499 4,424,270 0 less op COST 15,964,256
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1564.22% 267.44% -28.58% -100.00% prod surp 211,389 1.32%
TB 9,884,429 CS+EB 105,892,082
Y         
(S)
CS          
(S)          
EB           
(S)          
Y(MSL)      
(S) SS 106,103,472
P 2,432,928 29,647,536 857,533 1,749,090 less SS Cost 9,884,429
9.334436% 0.00% 1529.20% 279.70% -22.36% net SS 96,219,043 973.44%
221,220 1,364,099 36,604 117,820 TB undist 0
9.334436% 0.00% 1368.65% 242.28% -38.32% CB PS %PS SS %SS
2,654,148 31,011,635 894,137 1,866,910 105,892,082 211,389 1.32% 106,103,472 973.44%
0.00% 1521.40% 278.01% -23.61% 1417.10% 0.00% 0.00% 1375.45% -3672.73%
Y         
(ACC)     
CS          
(ACC)        
EB           
(ACC)        
Y(MSL)      
(ACC)
1,651,004 40,238,100 1,163,858 1,186,946
0.00% 1589.50% 279.70% -22.36%
2,573,105 31,732,848 851,505 1,370,415
0.00% 1575.65% 242.28% -38.32%
4,224,109 71,970,948 2,015,362 2,557,361
0.00% 1583.37% 262.94% -31.81%
 
 
Table 5:  Model outcome for the 5%-PBC scheme 
 
Model 
soln X q #bus used C        
Y         
(ACC+S)
CS   
(ACC+S)
EB           
(ACC+S)
Y(MSL)    
(ACC+S) X(MSL) Funding
Retn on 
cost
P-O 1,986,429 1.44 70 2,916,035 4,083,932 5,781,122 616,106 3,734,061 1,447,301 TB 9,884,429
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 37.60% 15.73% -1.26% -5.00% CS+EB PAY 494,222
OP-O 3,358,000 1.52 36 13,048,221 2,794,325 3,020,438 298,627 2,355,151 2,446,620 FARES 6,291,216
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 52.04% 15.09% -2.39% -5.00% CSO 9,390,207
TOTAL 5,344,429 1.51 70 15,964,256 6,878,257 8,801,560 914,733 6,089,212 3,893,921 less op COST 15,964,256
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 42.23% 15.52% -1.70% -5.00% prod surp 211,389 1.32%
TB 9,884,429 CS+EB 9,716,293
Y         
(S)
CS          
(S)          
EB           
(S)          
Y(MSL)    
(S) SS 9,927,682
P 2,432,928 2,452,522 261,370 2,224,499 less SS Cost 9,884,429
5.086524% 0.00% 34.77% 15.73% -1.26% net SS 43,253 0.44%
221,220 124,488 12,308 186,452 TB undist 0
5.086524% 0.00% 34.03% 15.09% -2.39% CB PS %PS SS %SS
2,654,148 2,577,010 273,678 2,410,950 9,716,293 211,389 1.32% 9,927,682 0.44%
0.00% 34.74% 15.70% -1.35% 39.20% 0.00% 0.00% 38.05% -101.61%
Y         
(ACC)     
CS          
(ACC)       
EB           
(ACC)        
Y(MSL)    
(ACC)
1,651,004 3,328,601 354,736 1,509,562
0.00% 39.76% 15.73% -1.26%
2,573,105 2,895,950 286,319 2,168,700
0.00% 52.92% 15.09% -2.39%
4,224,109 6,224,550 641,055 3,678,262
0.00% 45.59% 15.44% -1.93%
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Table 6:  Optimum “standard” operator strategy for mixed PBC schemes 
 
X q #bus C Y (ACC+S) 
5,344,429 1.51 70 15,964,256 6,878,257
 
The summary scheme results for the pure schemes and mixed schemes up to 30%-PBC 
are shown in Table 7, where outcomes are totalled/averaged across periods. Outcomes 
for each regulator strategy specified by (R, P) pairs are shown in each row of the table, 
where the R value is clear from the first column and the P value is shown in the second 
column. The declining YMSL values from which consumer surplus and external benefits 
are computed for the specified schemes, are shown in column 4. Consumer surplus and 
external benefits, both of which generate operator income under PBC schemes, are 
shown in columns 5 and 6 as a proportion of patronage above YMSL.  As such, they show 
the unit incentive payment per passenger trip (above MSL patronage) from consumer 
surplus and external benefits respectively. These payments increase as the PBC 
component of the scheme increases, reflecting the decreasing value of YMSL (note that 
the EB unit rate is averaged across all patronage above MSL even though it is 
applicable only to car switchers). The producer surplus (PS) rate is equal to the case B 
rate of return (1.32%), referred to as the normal rate of return, and CB shows the total 
consumer benefit. Column 6 shows the SS level improving with CB, but these are not 
comparable across schemes due to varying YMSL. (This will be addressed later) 
 
Table 7:  Scheme results for mixed PBC schemes 
 
Scheme X(MSL) P PS CB SS %PS %SS
CS*P      
/(Y-YMSL)  
(ACC+S)
EB*P        
/(Y-YMSL)    
(ACC+S)
Y(MSL)         
(ACC+S)
Pure MSL 4,098,864 0.000000% 211,389 7,334,972 7,546,362 1.32% -23.65% 0.00 0.00 6,194,356
1%-PBC 4,057,875 1.269504% 211,389 7,786,067 7,997,457 1.32% -19.09% 0.13 0.01 6,173,167
5%-PBC 3,893,921 5.086524% 211,389 9,716,293 9,927,682 1.32% 0.44% 0.57 0.06 6,089,212
10%-PBC 3,688,977 7.966483% 211,389 12,407,521 12,618,911 1.32% 27.66% 1.02 0.09 5,986,042
20%-PBC 3,279,091 10.577781% 211,389 18,689,043 18,900,432 1.32% 91.21% 1.69 0.12 5,785,458
30%-PBC 2,869,205 11.352685% 211,389 26,120,066 26,331,456 1.32% 166.39% 2.17 0.13 5,592,292
Pure PBC 0 9.334436% 211,389 105,892,082 106,103,472 1.32% 973.44% 3.92 0.11 4,424,270
 
Through optimising SS, the model provides an environment, as specified by the 
regulator parameters, consistent with the resulting maximum returns for both the 
operators and the regulator. Table 7 has shown that, changing the proportion (R) of 
PBC in the subsidy scheme will always allow current best operator practice, with a 
given fleet size and service quality, to lead to operator outcomes equivalent to the pure-
MSL scheme, as given by the case B outcome. In this paper, service quality is 
controlled through constraint (10), which requires extra buses if the service level 
measured by RVKM is to be increased. In the next section, fleet size is added to the 
standard operator strategy parameters to assess the potential for market growth.   
 
4.2. Operator strategy  
 
To maintain community service obligations while pursuing the case B outcomes, the 
operator strategies (X,q) used above restricted fare changes to ≤5%, and precluded 
optimisation over fleet size and service quality (κ). In the above environment, 
reductions to RVKM are restricted by the MSL, and the maximum fare increase, and 
increases are restricted by the fleet size and minimum service quality levels. In this 
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section, the service quality level is maintained and #bus is added to the operator strategy 
parameters to allow market expansion. In this way we establish the gains for a 
benchmark operator by increasing the service level. The impact of unrestricted fare 
increases is also analysed. These operator strategies are analysed in the context of 
varying regulator parameter settings.  
 
4.2.1. Operator strategy: fleet size 
 
To assess the effectiveness of PBC schemes in providing an environment within which 
patronage may be commercially expanded, the operator strategy parameter dbus, which 
gives the increase in fleetsize, is applied to both peak and off-peak bus deployment. For 
each scheme ranging from 0%- to 100%-PBC we start from the calibrated scheme, with 
dbus=0, and establish the sensitivity of outcomes to increasing dbus.  
 
The optimum standard outcome for the 5%-PBC scheme is shown in Table 5. Under 
5%-PBC the return to the operator (PS) varies with increasing fleet size reaching a 
maximum of 6.7% when 3 buses are added to the fleet. This approximates the maximum 
return under all other PBC-schemes.  
 
A feature of the operator strategies for the 5%-PBC scheme is that increasing RVKM is 
associated with decreasing total patronage. This is explained by contrasting operator 
strategies between the peak and off-peak periods outcome, which is apparent from 
Table 8. In the peak period, the service level increases with increasing dbus up to 
dbus=3 and is stable thereafter. Fares increase by 5% when dbus=1 and are stable 
thereafter, Costs increase steadily over the range of increasing fleet size24. In the off-
peak period, the service level, patronage and costs decrease with increasing dbus up to 
dbus=3 and these are stable thereafter. Fares increase to the maximum when dbus=2 
and are stable at that level thereafter. The result of the different strategies for peak and 
off-peak periods is that as the fleet size increases over the range of 0≤dbus≤3, total 
RVKM, and patronage decrease and are stable thereafter; costs decrease over the same 
range and increase slowly thereafter. The reason for the diversity of strategies is that the 
limited TB is more profitably secured from the peak market until dbus=3, after which 
the peak and off-peak markets are both stable.  
 
Table 8:  Peak and off-peak operator strategies: R=5% 
dbus X(P) X(OP) X(TOT) q(P) q(OP) q(TOT) C(P) C(OP) C(TOT) Y(P) Y(OP) Y(TOT) %PS %SS
0 1,986,429 3,358,000 5,344,429 1.44 1.52 1.51 2,916,035 13,048,221 15,964,256 4,083,932 2,794,325 6,878,257 1.32% 0.44%
1 2,014,806 3,274,865 5,289,671 1.51 1.55 1.55 2,959,395 12,681,966 15,641,361 4,086,454 2,725,145 6,811,599 3.99% 4.61%
2 2,043,184 3,174,066 5,217,250 1.51 1.60 1.58 2,999,640 12,253,681 15,253,321 4,104,961 2,638,954 6,743,915 6.55% 8.41%
3 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,010,246 12,216,677 15,226,923 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.70% 8.62%
4 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,018,515 12,216,677 15,235,193 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.64% 8.53%
5 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,026,808 12,216,677 15,243,485 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.58% 8.45%
6 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,035,123 12,216,677 15,251,800 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.52% 8.37%
7 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,043,461 12,216,677 15,260,139 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.47% 8.28%
8 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,051,822 12,216,677 15,268,500 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.41% 8.20%
9 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,060,206 12,216,677 15,276,884 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.35% 8.11%
10 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,068,613 12,216,677 15,285,291 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.29% 8.03%
11 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,077,044 12,216,677 15,293,721 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.23% 7.94%
12 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,085,497 12,216,677 15,302,174 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.17% 7.86%
 
                                                           
24 Total cost in Table 8 is initially greater at dbus=0 then decreases before increasing beyond 3 buses. The 
reason for the initial decrease in C(TOT) as dbus increases is that X(OP) is decreasing fairly rapidly at 
that time and the cost function has (XA-XB) in the exponent. This is required to implement the trade-off 
of Y(OP) for Y(P) through a trade-off of the corresponding X’s. Also, the X(OP)/X(P) rate of exchange is 
very high due to the relatively low kappa (OP) compared to kappa (P), where kappa measures average bus 
loading rates. 
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Funds available for the PBC component of the 5%-PBC scheme are $494,222, and this 
is realised by bus operators as P*(CS+EB) where P is around 5.1%.  Based on the 
optimisations, the PBC payments are shown in Table 9 to reach a maximum, on 
average, of 68 cents per passenger trip.  
 
Table 9:  Incentive payments 
per trip:   R=5%. 
 
dbus
CS*P       
/(Y-YMSL)   
(ACC+S)
EB*P       
/(Y-YMSL)   
(ACC+S)
0 0.57 0.06
1 0.59 0.06
2 0.61 0.06
3 0.62 0.06
4 0.62 0.06
5 0.62 0.06
6 0.62 0.06
7 0.62 0.06
8 0.62 0.06
9 0.62 0.06
10 0.62 0.06
11 0.62 0.06
12 0.62 0.06  
 
Similar analyses apply to operator strategies for other regulator schemes. In all cases the 
maximum achievable return to operators is around 6.7%.   
 
Figure C shows that under 0%-PBC, SS is optimised by the operator maximising 
patronage in both peak and off-peak markets, by maximising RVKM and lowering fares 
to fill the buses available.  This socially optimum strategy, with growing negative 
operator returns associated with increasing social surplus, is not practicable – the 
optimum social surplus will never be achieved. The dominant feature of Figure C is 
that the producer surplus rate functions for the various mixed-PBC schemes are similar, 
showing very little sensitivity to scheme parameters. The PS functions differ primarily 
for dbus up to 3, where they are in reverse order of R, indicating an operator preference 
for 1%-PBC.  
Performance-Based Quality Contracts for the Bus Sector:  Delivering Social and Commercial Value 
for Money 
Hensher & Houghton 
21 
 
Figure C:  Operator Returns to Dbus for varying R (%PBC) 
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The contrasting behaviour between the pure-MSL and mixed-PBC schemes is the more 
interesting when related to the regulator surplus rate, as in Figures D-F. The model 
objective is to maximise the social surplus resulting from the regulator’s scheme and the 
social surplus moves monotonously with the regulators surplus rate. Figure D shows 
that the interests of the operator are not consistent with those of the regulator for the 
pure-MSL scheme, but in Figures E and F these interests are seen to be aligned under 
PBC schemes. The important conclusion is that if the operator were to optimise 
performance under a given PBC scheme, the outcome will approximate that of the 
model. Indeed, the optimum operator strategy under all PBC schemes is dbus=3 and the 
other strategy components X, and q are as in the optimum social surplus outcome for the 
dbus=3 case.  The significant conclusion, therefore, is that a mixed PBC scheme brings 
together the operator and regulator objectives, to provide approximately optimum social 
surplus outcomes.  
 
Figure D:  Operator and Societal Returns to Dbus for 0%PBC 
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Figure E:  Operator and Societal Returns to Dbus for 1%PBC 
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Figure :  Operator and Societal Returns to Dbus for 5%PBC 
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Outcomes for social surplus are greatly influenced by the different YMSL points25 for the 
alternative schemes and hence SS is not comparable across schemes. The schemes may 
be brought to comparability by adding to SS for each scheme, a single valued estimate 
of the consumer surplus below YMSL. These CS estimates are shown in Table 10. The 
result is to order the schemes’ SS performance in reverse order of R. Given that R=0% 
has no practical value, best outcomes are indicated by 1%-PBC.  Given the PS function 
as shown in Figure E, the optimum operator strategy is to increase the fleet size by two 
and implement the corresponding strategy as shown in Table 11. Incentive payments 
for 1%-PBC are shown in Table 12. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
25 As we change the value of R (or 1-R), the baseline patronage changes and makes all patronage above it 
eligible for an incentive payment (through the determination of CS + EB). 
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Table 10:  CS below YMSL Estimates 
 
R 0% 1% 5% 10% 20% 30% 100%
CS Below 
Y(MSL) 213,311,719 210,286,631 198,400,981 184,016,746 156,761,490 131,418,594 1,580,438  
 
 
Table 11:  Peak and off-peak operator strategies:   R=1% 
 
dbus X(P) X(OP) X(TOT) q(P) q(OP) q(TOT) C(P) C(OP) C(TOT) Y(P) Y(OP) Y(TOT) %PS %SS
0 1,986,429 3,358,000 5,344,429 1.44 1.52 1.51 2,916,035 13,048,221 15,964,256 4,083,932 2,794,325 6,878,257 1.32% -19.09%
1 2,014,806 3,277,713 5,292,519 1.51 1.60 1.58 2,959,395 12,723,770 15,683,165 4,086,454 2,695,163 6,781,617 4.09% -14.74%
2 2,043,184 3,167,667 5,210,851 1.51 1.60 1.58 2,999,640 12,225,303 15,224,943 4,104,961 2,635,403 6,740,364 6.72% -10.88%
3 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,008,409 12,216,677 15,225,087 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.71% -10.90%
4 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,016,674 12,216,677 15,233,351 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.65% -10.98%
5 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,024,962 12,216,677 15,241,639 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.59% -11.06%
6 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,033,272 12,216,677 15,249,949 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.53% -11.15%
7 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,041,605 12,216,677 15,258,282 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.48% -11.23%
8 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,049,961 12,216,677 15,266,638 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.42% -11.32%
9 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,058,340 12,216,677 15,275,017 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.36% -11.40%
10 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,066,742 12,216,677 15,283,419 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.30% -11.49%
11 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,075,167 12,216,677 15,291,844 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.24% -11.57%
12 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,083,615 12,216,677 15,300,292 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.18% -11.66%
 
 
Table 12:  Incentive payments per trip:  R=1% 
 
dbus
CS*P       
/(Y-YMSL)   
(ACC+S)
EB*P       
/(Y-YMSL)   
(ACC+S)
0 0.13 0.01
1 0.13 0.02
2 0.14 0.02
3 0.14 0.02
4 0.14 0.02
5 0.14 0.02
6 0.14 0.02
7 0.14 0.02
8 0.14 0.02
9 0.14 0.02
10 0.14 0.02
11 0.14 0.02
12 0.14 0.02  
 
 
4.3. Operator strategy: fare bounds 
 
In the above analysis, fares have been free of a lower bound, but an upper bound of 5% 
increase has been in place as described in the introduction to Section 2. An upper fare 
bound to 10% with schemes calibrated as in the 5% example gives very similar results, 
but the returns to operators are higher. Again, the operator return functions are similar 
across schemes and the preferred scheme is 1%-PBC. The operator strategies and 
incentive payments for 1%-PBC are shown in Table 13 and Table 14 respectively. The 
returns to fleet size, shown in Figure G, indicate a fleet size increase of 4, and the 
associated optimum strategy is shown in the corresponding row of Table 13.  
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Table 13:  Peak and off-peak operator strategies:  R=1%,  q(UB)=10% 
 
dbus X(P) X(OP) X(TOT) q(P) q(OP) q(TOT) C(P) C(OP) C(TOT) Y(P) Y(OP) Y(TOT) %PS %SS
0 1,986,429 3,358,000 5,344,429 1.44 1.52 1.51 2,916,035 13,048,221 15,964,256 4,083,932 2,794,325 6,878,257 1.32% -19.09%
1 2,014,806 3,292,858 5,307,664 1.59 1.67 1.66 2,963,186 12,844,858 15,808,044 4,070,113 2,647,894 6,718,007 4.53% -13.98%
2 2,043,184 3,182,920 5,226,104 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,003,501 12,340,729 15,344,230 4,088,547 2,589,783 6,678,330 7.19% -10.07%
3 2,071,562 3,051,104 5,122,665 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,044,465 11,765,347 14,809,812 4,106,556 2,516,475 6,623,031 10.37% -5.68%
4 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,071,521 11,389,015 14,460,536 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.53% -2.90%
5 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,079,959 11,389,015 14,468,974 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.46% -2.99%
6 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,088,420 11,389,015 14,477,435 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.40% -3.07%
7 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,096,905 11,389,015 14,485,920 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.33% -3.16%
8 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,105,413 11,389,015 14,494,428 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.26% -3.25%
9 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,113,944 11,389,015 14,502,959 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.20% -3.33%
10 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,122,499 11,389,015 14,511,514 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.13% -3.42%
11 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,131,077 11,389,015 14,520,092 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.07% -3.51%
12 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,139,679 11,389,015 14,528,694 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.00% -3.59%
 
 
Table 14:  Incentive payments per trip: R=1%,  q(UB)=10% 
 
dbus
CS*P       
/(Y-YMSL)   
(ACC+S)
EB*P       
/(Y-YMSL)   
(ACC+S)
0 0.13 0.01
1 0.13 0.02
2 0.14 0.02
3 0.15 0.02
4 0.16 0.02
5 0.16 0.02
6 0.16 0.02
7 0.16 0.02
8 0.16 0.02
9 0.16 0.02
10 0.16 0.02
11 0.16 0.02
12 0.16 0.02  
 
Figure G:  Returns to fleet size and social surplus:  R=1%,  q(UB)=10% 
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The approach taken in this paper has been to define a set of regulator schemes (R, P) where P 
calibrates the “standard” operator strategy under R, and to allow operators to optimise their strategy 
within that scheme. The advantage of the proposed approach is that it aligns the interests of operator 
and regulator for all non-standard strategies, so that the operator left to optimise corporate 
performance will be working in the social interest. It is possible to calibrate other strategies, but this 
alignment-of-interests property is then lost. 
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4.4 The Preferred Transition Position for Reform in the Outer 
Metropolitan Area of Sydney 
The previous sections present a large number of potential ‘solutions’. Although we have 
discussed the range of outcomes based on specific assumptions such as the mix of MSL 
and PBC components and resulting user and environmental externality benefits together 
with the rates of return to the operator and the subsidy allocation, it is appropriate to 
conclude with what might appear to be a good starting set of condition for the 
introduction of performance-based contracts. A practitioner’s guide to the recommended 
transition strategy is summarised in point form in Appendix A. 
 
Assuming that the regulator will require an MSL component to the delivery of services, 
we recommend that the CSO payment for MSL delivery should be based on $2.60 in the 
peak and $2.30 in the off-peak per vehicle kilometre. The establishment of the incentive 
payment rates is determined externally for the environmental benefits (respectively for 
outer urban operators of $0.627/car vkm for peak travel and $0.177/car vkm for off-
peak travel). The rate for user benefit (ie consumer surplus) per bus passenger trip is 
determined by the optimisation procedure, conditional on the proportion of the CSO to 
be implemented (1-R) and the incentive payout rate to the operators (P). Given a 
subsidy scheme defined as 1%-PBC with a payout rate of P=1.269504% and a total 
subsidy budget of TB=$9,884,429, if fares are bounded above by a 5% increase, the 
benchmark operator may be expected to increase fleet size by two buses for a return on 
operator investment (PS) of 6.7%, and the average user benefit per passenger incentive 
payment may be expected to be $0.14. This is additional to an average fare of $1.51 
(peak) and $1.60 (off-peak). If fares are bounded above by a 10% increase, the 
benchmark operator may be expected to increase the fleet size by 4 for a return on 
operator investment (PS) of 12.53%, and the average user benefit per passenger 
incentive payment may be expected to be $0.18. This is additional to an average fare of 
$1.59 (peak) and $1.67 (off-peak). The unit rate of incentive payment has been derived 
by averaging across all passenger trips above MSL even though the EB unit rate only 
applies to converted car VKM. The adoption of an average incentive payment per 
passenger trip above YMSL makes for a very simple administrative formula. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Performance-based contracts (PBCs) have emerged as a practical contracting regime 
with many virtues. Under a transparent partnership between the regulator and the 
service provider, a PBC offers a most effective way of delivering transport services, 
ensuring over time that the allocation of subsidy is determined optimally from a system-
wide perspective, not on an individual contract by individual contract basis (as would be 
required under other contracting regimes)26. In achieving system-wide optimisation, all 
                                                           
26 There is growing concern in England that concessionary fare subsidies are not matched by appropriate 
‘deliverable and measurable outputs’ (DLTR 2002). The Director-General of the Greater Manchester 
Passenger Transport Executive stated in a submission to the House of Commons Transport Select 
Committee’s inquiry on the bus industry that “We would like to reach a point where all the money paid to 
the bus industry is linked in some way to outputs’. The most interesting feature of the reform proposal is, 
over a 3-5 year period, to transfer some or all of the concessionary fares budget into a central pot. 
Operators would then be asked to come forward with proposals for delivering a network of commercial 
and supported services determined by the central authority and 10 metropolitan governments. This has 
been described as ‘voluntary quality contracts’ that push at the limits of quality partnerships but which is 
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parties should share the risks and rewards that quality partnerships can deliver (in 
contrast competitive tendering27 suggests a principal-agent relationship which is not as 
partnership compatible). 
 
The proposed system of subsidy which makes profit maximisation on the part of 
operators and social surplus maximisation coincide appears to offer a very 
attractive contract regime. Nash and Jansson (2002) in reviewing alternative 
reform schemes introduced over the last 15 years, conclude that “the regulatory 
phase could be better managed this time round, with an emphasis on 'light touch' 
regulation, perhaps combined with the appropriate use of subsidies per passenger 
kilometre and infrastructure charges to incentivise the franchisee to provide the 
socially optimum fares/service combination’. This is the intent of PBCs both in 
transition and post-transition. 
 
The method developed and implemented in this paper is sufficiently flexible to be 
applicable under a large number of regulatory and operating regimes. For example, it is 
feasible to consider alternative fare increase caps, different aggregate subsidy budget 
levels (be they increments of decrements on existing levels), variations in minimum-
service levels and incentive payment rates for environmental benefits, and acceptable 
commercial returns. The ability to recognise the full extent of consumer (ie user) surplus 
benefits to society and to determine the amount that might reasonable be paid to 
operators to ensure that the returns are incentive-compatible, without delivering 
unacceptable high rates of return on investment from the provision of public funds, is a 
very appealing feature of the approach.  
 
Looking ahead, it is important to keep in mind that the model developed herein is a 
model for the benchmark (in terms of cost efficiency) operator who begins from an 
optimum position. The model performance reflects this. Hence it is an appealing 
transition model. With the existing #bus the case B solution is optimum; and, as the 
fleet is expanded, improved "non-standard" strategies are found. These are, however, 
trade-off positions, typically involving an expansion in the peak period and a cut back in 
the off-peak period. The trade-off is required by the total subsidy budget and is 
consistent with PBC funding being essential for a benchmark operator's expansion.  
 
The approach of optimising within a given R, and calibrating to the "standard" strategy 
is fundamental to the specific PBC implementation strategy. First, SS comparisons 
across R are not made within the model (nor should they be); and second, calibrating to 
other strategies departs from the assumption of a benchmark operator, and also provides 
                                                                                                                                                                              
necessary to improve the increasingly poor quality of service levels of bus provision (which has evolved 
out of economic deregulation and competitive tendering of non-commercial services). 
27 Although competitive tendering of PBC’s is possible it must be based on a selection system that 
involves quality criteria rather than the conventional tendering processes (is the ‘lowest price wins’). 
Telemark County in southern Norway has recently adopted this model, although it is too early to see how 
it compares with PBC’s per se. The ability to optimise system-wide social surplus still remains a 
challenge however. In a recent review of competitive tendering in Adelaide and Perth, Bray (2002) in 
commenting on Hensher and Stanley (2002) statement ‘performance based contracts should deliver better 
long-term value for money to governments and consumers than the competitive tendering (CT) of bus 
contracts’ concludes that ‘they may well be correct’. He then asks a question: “If the CT process was run 
again in Perth and Adelaide would any further meaningful savings be achieved particularly when 
considering the enormous cost of the tendering process for regulators and operators?”. 
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schemes with competing operator-regulator interests. An unrestricted optimisation 
across R, P, X, q, and dbus will give the nonsense outcome: R=100%, P is calibrated to 
100% and %PS is large and negative.  
 
Hensher and Houghton (in progress) recognise that the PBC framework developed 
herein can be extended beyond the transition stage, to encourage growth from transition, 
and to establish the social surplus maximisation solution under an unconstrained total 
subsidy budget. This stage of growth after transition will consolidate the fuller extent of 
value for money under a PBC regime. The transition stage however is crucial in an 
environment where established operators have demonstrated (to varying degrees) the 
ability to deliver service quality. The transition to an incentive-compatible contract 
scheme should ensure greater gains to society in the future which may have been denied 
by the existing contract regime28. Future research will develop decision rules for 
applying the scheme in new regions.  
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Appendix A: A Summary of the Main Features of a 
Practical PBC Transitional Scheme for Sydney 
1. This appendix sets out the main elements of a PBC system introduced in a 
transition phase before moving to a fuller PBC scheme. In the transition phase 
we commit the government to the exact same level of financial support as 
currently received under each contract. The majority of this support is from the 
school subsidy transport scheme (SSTS) and concessional reimbursements. 
 
2. We call this total support TB (total subsidy budget). It will be imposed in the 
transition phase as an upper limit. The method developed in the body of the 
paper enables us to vary the TB upwards (or downwards) which will be 
desirable in the post-transition phase as government seeks out the best value for 
money solution. 
 
3. Maintaining the notion of a minimum service level (MSL), the first step is to 
identify the community service obligation ($CSO) payment in order to see what 
will be left over from TSB as an incentive payment (provided patronage is 
grown). (An important aside: any concern about an operator’s ability to survive 
without high CSO payments does not become an issue since the PBC scheme in 
the transition phase will support existing financial arrangements).  
 
4. Calculation of $CSO requires determination of the appropriate MSL. We will 
base it on existing levels as defined by RVKM (revenue vehicle kilometres). 
Given RVKM associated with MSL and average fare (as well as the existing 
ratio of seating capacity and RVKM (a proxy for service quality)), the PBC 
method uses a simple demand model to establish patronage levels associated 
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with MSL (see Section 3). We distinguish 'adults, children and concession' 
(ACC) from 'school children' (S), since the fare level does not apply in the 
latter's demand model. 
 
5. The resulting patronage is called YMSL. This patronage has a fare associated with 
it (if ACC) which is collected and kept by the operator in addition to the $CSO, 
the latter based on $/VKM multiplied by RVKMMSL. We are using benchmarked 
best practice costs ($2.60 for peak and $2.30 for off-peak) for private operators 
in Sydney. These unit costs could be varied if there is evidence to support an 
equity-adjusted cost efficient benchmark. (SSTS and all concessions 
reimbursements are no longer paid, which is a huge administration gain). 
 
6. The total revenue associated with $CSO plus YMSL patronage fares can be built 
on by attracting additional patronage (above YMSL). 
 
7. Given that we want to ensure that society gets value for money in the spending 
of TB, we need a way of calculating the maximum achievable social surplus. 
This involves recognising that the social surplus may well exceed TB and hence 
the operator should get only part of this social surplus.  
 
8. Because of different capabilities of operators to attract patronage (because of 
different operating environments) we need a way of ensuring some equity in 
establishing the incentive payment available. We do this by taking each 
operating area and running the social surplus (SS) maximisation model in which 
we hold $CSO fixed but allow VKM(RVKM) to increase above 
VKM(RVKM)MSL, fares to vary up or down with a 5% cap on fare increases, and 
fleet size to increase but holding service quality fixed (the latter defined by ratio 
of seating capacity and patronage, must not decline). 
 
9. This SS maximisation model (developed and detailed in the body of the paper) 
will enable us to identify the most likely achievable patronage growth (ie 
patronage above MSL level), some of which operators already have by 
providing better than MSL services.  
 
10. The additional patronage will pay fares (if ACC) or travel for free if they are 
school children (our model makes this distinction). Together with $CSO and 
fare revenue for MSL-level patronage, we can calculate the total fare and CSO 
payment revenue. The difference between TB and ($CSO plus all fare revenue) 
is the amount available as incentive payments to be paid out for the additional 
patronage. (Note: this is determined by our fixed TB).  
 
11. Under the fixed TB, all incentive payments would actually be distributed 
because they are achievable (ie passenger trips above YMSL are already being 
undertaken). However if TB were further increased, that money would not be 
automatically provided without additional patronage growth.(This latter growth 
is linked with what we refer to as ‘growth after transition’) But now we have an 
appropriate framework to ensure that each additional subsidy dollar delivers 
value for money. 
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12. When we compare all income sources to the total annual costs of running the 
business including an acceptable return on investment we should have operator 
balance.  
 
13. What we have is a contract system that has led to the removal of SSTS and 
concessional reimbursements and re-focused on incentives to grow patronage. 
Although the case study in the body of the paper imposes a budget limit based 
on the existing TB level, it is now possible for the government to increase TB 
but only return the increase to the operator if they grow patronage. We now have 
an incentive-compatible contract scheme for the first time. 
 
Appendix B: Partial withholding of fare revenue 
 
The model may be used to test a variety of scenarios, in the manner of the 10% fare cap 
in the text. In this appendix we consider an alternative scenario to assess the effect of a 
partial withholding of fare revenue. Here, the regulator withdraws from the operator, 
fare revenue generated by Y<YMSL. The motivation is the belief that operators are 
already paid at benchmark cost rates for X≤XMSL and fare revenue would repeat the 
payment. However, the fares are currently a part of the operator’s revenue, and the total 
subsidy budget (TB) has replaced the SSTS subsidy. On this basis, the benchmark 
operator has expanded the service level to its current level which exceeds XMSL by 50%. 
Clearly, if the service level is to be maintained, withdrawing the fare revenue as 
proposed will convert the current 1.32% rate of return into a serious loss.  
 
Outcomes are shown in Figure Z, where optimum rates of return across R for both the 
operator and the regulator are seen to be negative. Clearly, the scenario is impracticable.  
 
Figure Z:  OPTIMUM %PS AND %SS FOR SCENARIO 3 
 
%PS and %SS: scenario 3
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the recent period of significant change in the way that bus services are supplied in 
many countries, a key focus has been the delivery of cost efficient services (through 
mixtures of privatisation, economic deregulation and competitive tendering) and finding 
ways to grow patronage (Hensher 2002a). Despite all the developments to improve the 
cost and service efficiency of operations, something has often been shown to be lacking 
– the global picture which recognises that public transport is, above all, provided 
through a supply chain in which different objectives apply such as commercial and 
social obligations. This broad and more holistic approach presented in Hensher and 
Macario (2002) recognises that no institution is able to act without affecting the other 
agents in the system.  Social surplus maximisation (SSM) principles applied to transport 
tend to suffer when the focus is narrowed to the detail of cost efficient operations (the 
dominating focus in recent years of competitive tendering), losing to a growing extent 
the SSM aim associated with an overall mobility system.  A big challenge is to re-focus 
on the integration of SSM and commercial objectives in a way that delivers much 
improved service levels as part of what might be generically termed a value for money 
objective function.  The holistic vision is to pursue social planning with a commitment 
to commercial objectives and opportunities at the operational level under a cost and 
service efficiency regime, thereby recognising the real meaning of optimum subsidy. 
This theoretical approach is not new and was articulated in the public transport context 
over 18 years ago by Jansson (1984), and more recently by Jansson (2001)1.  
 
As part of the many reviews of the contracting regimes that bus businesses operate 
within, it has been recognised that the relationship between commercial and social 
objectives has not been investigated in a systematic manner. To what extent are existing 
subsidy support levels optimal? What exactly does this mean? One issue of interest to 
many governments is growing bus patronage that in particular switches from the car and 
hence reduces the negative environmental impacts of transport (Hensher 2002a).  Thus 
an important task in the review of a service delivery regime is the establishment of an 
optimum system-wide subsidy system for the provision of bus services such that a profit 
maximisation level of passenger trip activity on the part of the operator will coincide 
with social surplus maximisation objectives. Economists when integrating these two 
maximisation objectives refer to social surplus (SS) maximisation as the sum of 
producer surplus (PS) (maximisation) and consumer surplus (CS) (maximisation). The 
former is equivalent (under a cost-efficiency regime) to profit maximisation for private 
bus operators. In most cost-benefit analyses undertaken by the public sector, there has 
been an almost total focus on consumer surplus maximisation, defining net benefit as 
the difference between consumer surplus in the presence and absence of a policy 
                                                           
1 Jan Owen Jansson in his plenary paper at the 7th International Conference on Competition and 
Ownership of Land Passenger Transport (Jansson 2001) states: 
 
“Two main possibilities for improvement [in cost efficiency] are to stimulate competition, and to 
enhance the motivation and creativity of operators by introducing the profit motive into a 
traditional ‘public service’. The question is, if the present allocative inefficiency in transport 
markets will be improved in the process, it is argued that these changes will not be brought about 
by the increased reliance on market forces. On the contrary, better planning of public transport 
systems, and, I dare say, continued or increased subsidization are two necessary conditions for 
realizing the potential improvement of the resource allocation. A complementary, significant 
point is, however, that there is no inevitable conflict between the ambition to increase cost 
efficiency in public transport, and a transport policy towards an efficient modal split.” 
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instrument (typically measured by changes in generalised cost). Yet it is the sum of PS 
and CS that represents the overall benefit to society. Thus failure to take into account 
the operator’s objective function is a failure to recognise social optimality.  
 
One of the most innovative payment schemes designed to secure socially optimum 
behavioural responses from transport operators has been developed in Norway for 
application in Hordaland County2. The local government makes payments to the bus 
operators through an incentive scheme that “pays for results rather than shares the costs 
of inputs” (Carlquist 2001)3. The approach identifies a set of ‘external’ effects that are 
typically not taken into account by the individual traveller when choosing a transport 
mode.4  Hensher and Stanley (2002) provide more details on this scheme as well as 
other approaches to the establishment of performance-based contracts. 
 
When a traveller chooses to go by car, the decision-maker ignores the external costs 
imposed on others (eg. the costs of congestion, accident risk and pollution) – assuming 
(as usual) that the institutional context does not allow the deployment of (first-best) car-
user charges to reflect these costs. Conversely, an extra traveller who goes by bus (or 
other public transport) helps to create a positive external effect – often called the 
Mohring effect: as patronage increases on a route (or in a particular area), the (socially) 
optimum service frequency also increases. This benefits the new travellers (whose 
patronage has led to the service improvement), and also reduces trip time for those 
others who continue to use the service. 
 
In the absence of practicable price discrimination, the operator is not able to extract the 
increase in consumer surplus that is enjoyed by the continuing users as a result of the 
increase in frequency – because a fare increase for all passengers would preclude some 
or all of the extra travel that justifies and requires the extra frequency. To achieve the 
optimum service level, a government-funded incentive payment is needed. To the extent 
that the incentive payments result in lower fares and/or improved service levels, there 
can be social benefit from increased travel (that is, generated trips) as well as from the 
reduction in car travel. This too should be recognised in establishing the incentive 
payments. 
 
The apparent conflict between the operator’s objective function and that of SS 
maximisation is primarily related to the absence of the use of benchmarked best practice 
costing and the presence of externalities linked to environmental (eg congestion, 
pollution) and social (eg equity) impacts that are not internalised in the operator’s profit 
and loss account. If SS maximisation imposes a substantial financial loss on the 
operator it would be unacceptable to the operator. If however a positive change in CS 
(based on private user benefits) and non-internalised environmental externality benefits 
(EB)5 would increase revenue (and conversely decrease revenue for a negative change 
in CS and EB), the operator would have the necessary incentive to act as a social 
surplus maximiser. The question then becomes one of identifying how this incentive can 
                                                           
2 An area that includes the city of Bergen as well as some surrounding rural areas. 
3 Competitive tendering as implemented, in contrast, has mainly focussed on sharing the costs of inputs. 
4 Although the principal modal choice in the Hordaland context is between bus and car, the competition 
can be generalised to include rail, ferry etc. 
5 Strictly, consumer surplus (CS) is the sum of private user benefits (UB) and (internalised) 
environmental benefits (EB), but herein we treat them as separate benefit sources, referring to private user 
benefits as consumer surplus.  
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be provided in practice. The implementation ‘solution’ appears to lie in changes to the 
pricing (ie fare) and/or supply regulations in a way that opens up opportunities for the 
operator and the regulator (the latter acting on behalf of the government) to seek out 
incentive-based mechanisms that reflect the challenge to internalise CS and EB6. This 
should hopefully provide the necessary freedom and (positive) incentives for the 
operator to pro-actively participate in pricing policy and service design to increase cost 
efficiency as well as allocative efficiency. The benchmark for progress however is 
internalisation of CS and EB, achieved by the mix of internalised cost recovery and 
externalised funding by the provision of an optimum subsidy (or incentive-payment).   
 
What formula will work in practice that is acceptable to both the operator and the 
regulator? One thing is almost certain - there will need to be a transparent level of 
external subsidy7.  If a scheme is to work, however, it must prevent cost inefficiency 
(which can be a product of subsidy support, as indeed can poor service delivery). An 
effective monitoring and benchmarking program is critical8 to ensure that cost 
inefficiency does not occur as the subsidy is introduced to support initiatives that deliver 
consumer surplus, and that external funding delivers the best value for money.  
Periodically reviewed benchmark best cost practice associated with specific 
geographical settings should be the basis of subsidy determination. 
 
The following sections of the paper review the elements of a VM regime within the 
setting of an incentive-based performance contract and develops a formal (economic) 
framework for establishing an optimum subsidy based on maximisation of social 
surplus. The maximisation of social surplus is subject to a number of constraints 
including the commercial imperative of the operator, minimum service levels and a fare 
and subsidy budget cap. An important feature of the performance-based quality contract 
regime is a passenger-based incentive payment scheme incorporating a subsidy per 
additional passenger trip above that patronage delivered under minimum service and 
fare levels. In this way, rewards to operators are revealed through the fare box, through 
increased consumer surplus and through reductions in negative externalities associated 
with car use. The implementation of performance-based contracts is illustrated using 
data collected in 2002 from private operators in the Sydney Metropolitan Area. 
Appendix A summarises the main elements of a PBS transitional scheme for Sydney. 
PBCs can be designed to accommodate both transition from an existing regime and 
post-transition growth strategies. 
                                                           
6 It must also be recognised that the delivery of positive CS under a subsidy-scheme recognises the 
presence of under-pricing of competing modes such as the car. Subsidies to public transport are designed 
to bring its operation into line with social considerations. In particular, when car users are not charged for 
the negative externalities that arise from their car use, subsidies for bus services can help to encourage 
travellers to make appropriate choices between travel modes. Yet, when privatisation and contracting-out 
of bus services came into vogue in the mid-1980s, the principal aims were simply to reduce subsidies and 
to increase cost efficiency. In recent years, the focus has turned to the shaping of payment instruments to 
try to secure behavioural responses that support the specific policy purposes of the government 
instrumentality that pays the subsidy.  
7 This is separate from any operator commitment to internal cross-subsidy between various activities that 
is consistent with efficiency objectives provided that avoidable costs are covered on each (well-defined) 
activity. 
8 We recognise that monitoring of performance cannot be precise and must be dependent on trust and 
quality reporting (Carlquist 2001). Such a monitoring program should focus on the three dimensions of 
overall performance:  cost efficiency, cost effectiveness and service effectiveness. The role of constructs 
such as a Service Quality Index (SQI) developed by Hensher and his colleagues (eg Prioni and Hensher 
2000, Hensher and Prioni 2002, Hensher et al 2002) offers one way of tracking the last dimension.  
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2. Incentive-Based Performance Contracts 
 
Before setting out the formal economic framework for a proposed performance-based 
contract regime (for Australia), we will take a closer look at a recent initiative in 
Norway that promotes the PBC regime over competitive tendering9. New performance 
contracts were established, in early 2000, for the three bus operators in the Hordaland 
county. One of these serves the urban area; the other two operate in rural areas and on 
the main corridors into Bergen. There is little or no on-the-road competition. 
 
The design of the Hordaland payment mechanism is innovative. Larsen and his 
colleagues (Larsen 2001, Johansen et al 2001) develop a two stage procedure where the 
first stage determines fare levels, bus revenue-km and bus capacities to maximise a 
social welfare function (essentially SS maximisation). The second stage calculates rates 
for fare subsidies, and for revenue-km subsidies (applicable in the peak and/or periods), 
that will induce a profit-maximising operator to choose the (socially) optimum levels for 
revenue-km and for bus capacities. This statement in italics is the essence of the 
approach providing the link between commercial and social objectives. The operator 
does not set fare levels but complies with maximum fare levels set by the authority. The 
per-passenger remuneration received by the operator is the sum of the fare level 
(determined in the first-stage welfare-maximising calculation) and the subsidy level 
(determined in the second-stage calculation). 
 
In this approach, a per-passenger subsidy, or fare subsidy ‘pays for results’ and the 
revenue-km payment reimburses some of the costs. The operator also receives the fare 
revenue and both kinds of revenue together provide the operator with sufficient income 
to balance the operating costs. In other words, the revenue-km subsidy will not 
encourage an operator to run empty vehicles. It does encourage service frequency and 
the extent of the induced increase in frequency depends on how vigorously (and 
successfully) the operator pursues profits. What we have here is an incentive-based 
performance contract where the subsidy is set to match the sum of the avoided external 
costs of car use and the benefits of increased service frequency.   
 
The welfare outcomes depend on the details of the implementation. The implementation 
of the Hordaland model is described in Carlquist (2001)10. Each operator has a 
separately calibrated contract. As in earlier contracts, these are on a net-cost basis; but 
unlike the Larsen (2001) model, each operator may determine the fare levels. In the 
                                                           
9 The evidence is drawn from Carlquist (2001), Larsen (2001), Johansen et al (2001), Mills and Gale 
(2002). Hensher and Stanley (2002) provide further details of the Norwegian model and the arguments for 
PBC compared to Competitive Tendering.  
10 As an example of the subsidy calculation, using vehicle kilometres (VKM) as the performance criterion 
and $/vkm as the cost rate (RATE), with the subsidy subject to a maximum predetermined level, the 
subsidy in year t = (RATE*VKMt) minus a fixed deduction as explained in Larsen (2001). Profits are co-
determined by different performance-based items – ticket revenues (I), subsidies (S), and costs (C). Ticket 
revenue is equal to fare (F) multiplied by demand (D), and demand is a function of VKM, fares and other 
service attributes.  That is: profits=I+S-C, C=f(VKM), I=F*X and X=g(VKM,F,…). Given the right 
incentive (ie RATE) the operator will decide on a fare level and VKM at a level that maximises profits 
and maximises social welfare given the budgetary limits for subsidy support. The budgetary limit is often 
associated with a constrained social welfare maximisation rule (or Ramsey rule) that implicitly imposes a 
marginal cost of government funds on the calculation (ie the amount that government is willing and 
possibly able to contribute to the social welfare objective).  
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event, the implemented contracts do not include any per-passenger subsidy, in part 
because the (global) budget constraint limited the amounts of subsidy that could be 
paid11. The Larsen modelling had suggested such subsidy should be paid, but only 
where the fare was significantly less than the marginal cost – as for peak-period rural 
services. The revenue-km subsidy has been implemented through two components – one 
subsidy rate per vehicle-km and another per vehicle-hour, to accommodate differences 
between congested urban conditions and non-congested rural operation. 
 
The subsidy rates are calculated to secure optimum marginal conditions. In principle, 
there is no certainty that the total amount of subsidy will be such as to enable the 
operator to receive as much as, and no more than, a reasonable return on investment. 
Numerical calculations prepared by Larsen show that the urban operator (in particular) 
would be likely to receive a substantial level of excess profit. This arises because the 
marginal cost of the peak services is very much higher than the cost of the other 
(‘basic’) services, which are a substantial part of the total offering. Accordingly, a ‘fixed 
deduction’ was suggested. Being fixed in total amount, this has no effect on the 
(marginal) incentive structure. Carlquist reports that the fixed-deduction principle was 
incorporated in the implemented contracts. 
 
In the first year (2001) of the deployment of the new performance contracts, there has 
been little change (especially in regard to route networks) – in part because the budget 
constraint was tight enough to limit the scope for change, and in part (perhaps) because 
of inertia, including political resistance to change. Nevertheless Carlquist (2001) 
reported that experience with the new contracts is generally well regarded. 
 
The Hordaland model has provided the starting position for the authors’ proposal for a 
PBC framework for Australia. The data used to illustrate the implementation of a PBC 
regime has been obtained from a major private operator who is widely regarded as 
operating at best practice with respect to cost efficiency and effectiveness. Thus the 
approach detailed below is indicative of the outcomes one might anticipate under a PBC 
regime for an outer urban area bus operator in a major city in Australia. We focus on a 
PBC scheme under a transition from the existing contract regime but show that once the 
transition is complete, the very same PBC scheme can be used to promote growth in 
passenger trips through improved service levels supported by incentive payments 
(Hensher and Houghton (in progress)). 
 
3. The Australian PBC Proposition  
 
The proposed PBC framework is based upon a model system that recognises the 
obligations of government, as well as the need to provide appropriate incentives to 
operators to service the market in line with value for money under a tight subsidy 
regime. In addition, we recognise the constraints under which the regulator charged with 
implementing and monitoring a contract regime operates. In NSW, for example, a 
                                                           
11 The global budget constraint is a very important parameter for the NSW government because it is at the 
heart of the Bus Reform agenda. The intent appears to be clear – to provide increased value for money 
within a system-wide pre-determined maximum budget. As detailed herein PBC’s can be developed for 
transition (holding existing subsidy levels fixed) and then later allow the subsidy level to vary as the 
reward for growing patronage. 
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paramount requirement is for a minimum12 administrative burden based on suitable 
reliable data provided by bus operators.  
 
The PBC framework is assumed to be implemented system-wide over a pre-defined 
geographical area (but can also be implemented for a single operator). We distinguish 
between metropolitan and non-metropolitan settings and focus herein on the 
metropolitan model. Furthermore we recognise intra-metropolitan differences in the 
operating environment, especially due to patronage catchment, traffic congestion and 
time of day. These differences are accommodated (to a large extent) by distinguishing 
between inner and outer metropolitan areas as well as peak and off-peak periods.  
Where minimum service levels (MSLs) are required, they will be set exogenously for 
each region and period based on a grading system determined (outside of the PBC 
structure) by a number of criteria including population, population density and 
incidence of school children13. All costs used will be assumed to be benchmarked best 
practice for the specific context. The use of benchmarked costs ensures that optimum 
subsidies are based on cost efficient service levels14.  
 
3.1 Defining Annual Passenger Demand 
The demand for bus travel (Y) is defined as one-way annual passenger trips15 per 
contract period, and is assumed to be influenced by fares (q) and service levels (X), 
where the latter is proxied by revenue vehicle kilometres (ie total vehicle kilometres 
minus dead running kilometres). Since the categories of bus passengers have differing 
degrees of behavioural responsiveness to changes in fares and service levels, separate 
passenger demand models are required for each segment. Within each geographical 
context, we initially propose separate demand models for peak and off-peak travel for 
two broad classes of travellers: (i) adults, (fare paying) children and concession 
travellers (ACC) and (ii) school children (S). Further segmentation can be introduced as 
required. There are many specifications available to represent travel demand. We have 
chosen equation form (1) for class (i) travellers and a separate equation form (2) for 
class (ii) travellers, where the latter applies when school children do not pay a fare. 
Before the implementation of the proposed scheme (base case B), demand levels, YB, are 
based on existing fares and service levels. After the implementation of the proposed 
scheme (Application case A), predicted demand, YA, is a function of a base demand (YB); 
the direct fare elasticity of demand and the direct revenue vehicle kilometre elasticity of 
demand; and operator responses to the scheme through changes to fares and revenue 
                                                           
12 And certainly no increase over existing regulatory resource commitments. 
13 Although we specify MSL in terms of a minimum amount of revenue vehicle kilometres, the regulator 
may wish to impose some very specific conditions on where and when these RVKM are to be provided 
within the contract area. This is not an issue of concern to establishing the appropriate level of incentive 
payment given a system-wide subsidy budget since all we need to know is the minimum RVKM for each 
of the peak and of-peak periods for each contract area. We have doubts about the benefit of imposing too 
rigid a service specification as is currently the situation in NSW because it results in many services with 
very little patronage and substantial cost-burdens that do not provide real benefits to society. Spreading 
thin resources thinly is not a virtue that we should promote. Larsen (2001, page 2) promotes a view that 
“…the design of a route system is best left to an operator familiar with the area to be served”. There are 
sensible reasons for moving from the tactical to operator level the fare structure, fare level, route 
networks and timetables within the parameters of the incentive-driven quality contract. 
14 If there is a case for differences in cost efficient rates (for whatever reason, such as an equity-
adjustment), this can be included. 
15 A passenger trip is defined as a single one-way trip from an origin to a destination. If a transfer between 
buses is required this is not two passenger trips. 
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vehicle kilometres. The elasticities used in equation (1) for each of peak and off-peak 
activity are weighted averages across the classes of travellers within the separate 
demand categories. 
 
( ) ( )*exp[ ( ) ( )]
q X
Y ACC Y ACCA B A B A B
ACC ACC B BY Y q q X Xq X
ε ε
= − + −     
  (1) 
( )*exp[ ( )]
X
Y SA B A B
S S BY Y X XX
ε
= −        
  (2) 
 
We initially assume a static representation with the annual patronage response assumed 
to occur at the specified rate over the period of a contract. For class (i) travellers, the set 
of fare elasticities is respectively -.20 and -.45 for the peak and off-peak periods, and the 
service (RVKM) elasticities are 0.33 and 0.63. For class (ii) travellers, the service 
elasticities are assumed to be the same as class (i), on the assumption that the parent 
traveller decides on the school child’s modal activity.  
 
The PBC system requires a base prediction of patronage associated with minimum 
service levels16. To obtain this patronage we use the level of RVKM associated with 
MSL and impose a fare level unchanged from case B. The resulting MSL patronage for 
class (i) travellers is YB in (3). 
 
( )*exp[ ( )]
X
Y ACCMSL B MSL B
ACC ACC BY Y X XX
ε
= −  (3)  
  
In what follows YA, YB, YMSL will be used in place of ( )A AACC SY Y+ . 
   
3.2 Defining Annual Total Cost 
Benchmark cost efficiency is formalised by a set of total annual cost equations (4) for 
each period and region. Total predicted cost (C) is defined as a function of benchmarked 
base cost (calculated from best practice total cost per kilometre); predicted responses in 
total vehicle kilometres (VKM) (including dead running kilometres), predicted changes 
in total passenger demand (from equations 1 and 2), predicted responses in total seat 
capacity per revenue vehicle kilometre; and the respective set of cost elasticities for 
VKM, patronage and bus capacity. VKM is the sum of revenue and dead running 
kilometres with the default value in our empirical example for dead running VKM set 
equal to12.5% of VKM for both peak and off-peak activity (That is, VKM = 
1.1258RVKM). Bus capacity (defined by seating and standing capacity per bus 
multiplied by the number of buses) impacts on passenger demand through revenue 
vehicle kilometres through a service quality constraint that indicates how much bus 
capacity must be provided to satisfy passenger trip demand. This then translates into 
vehicle kilometres which impacts on total annual cost, and takes into account the 
annualised cost of bus capital. The starting passenger trip-demand elasticities of cost are 
respectively -0.32 and -0.20 for the peak and off-peak periods. The equivalent service 
                                                           
16 An MSL is not a necessary input into the determination of a PBC but we include it as a specific input 
given that the regulator may require its inclusion. In section 4 we will show what the implications are for 
determining the maximum social surplus solution when there is no MSL.  
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(RVKM) elasticities are 0.76 and 1.20; and the equivalent fleet size elasticity, which is 
derived from increased capital charges and applies only to peak periods, is 0.19. The 
separate cost equation for peak and off-peak periods, for each region and period, has the 
form of (4). 
   
 
( ) ( ) #
*exp[ ( ) ( ) ( ) (# # )]
#
X Y ACC Y S bus
A B A B A B A B A BC C C C
ACC ACC S SB B B B
ACC S
C C VKM VKM Y Y Y Y bus bus
VKM Y Y bus
ε ε ε ε
= − + − + − + −  (4) 
 
 3.3 Defining the Constraints  
There are a number of constraints that enable us to represent the environment in which 
the delivery of services satisfies all stakeholders. The key constraints are shown below. 
 
3.3.1 Fare Cap 
 
A fare cap (5) over the contract period for each peak/off-peak period and region is a 
political reality in most jurisdictions and in Australia (maximum) fares typically may 
not increase by more than the consumer price index. The introduction of performance-
based contracts must comply with this condition, set as a 5% maximum increase per 
annum. This can be adjusted to suit the political setting. 
 
 
                                                         qA – 1.05qB ≤ 0 (5) 
 
3.3.2 Vehicle Kilometres (VKM) 
 
A condition of public transport service delivery often included in contracts is that there 
is a minimum level of service that must be provided under community service 
obligations (CSO) at cost efficient levels. These service levels are determined by 
external criteria set by government such as a requirement to provide a minimum amount 
of vehicle kilometres depending on the socio-economic and demographic profile of the 
region to be served. This profile must be defined by an agreed set of criteria such as 
total resident population, population density (1000’s of people per square kilometre), 
the percentage of total population that are school children and availability of other 
modes (eg a train service) (see Ton and Hensher 1997). On the basis of a weighted 
system for each criterion, a minimum amount of RVKM is required for each period and 
region. The precise geographical allocation of this MSL is a detail of specific contract 
compliance and has no impact on the determination of the optimal social solution. This 
minimum RVKM would ideally be an absolute amount; but for the present application 
we define it as 67% of current service VKM’s17.  Condition (6) defines the minimum 
level of service (MSL). A total cost per kilometre can be introduced to convert this MSL 
to a dollar commitment from government. We assume $VKM = $2.60 in the peak and 
$2.30 in the off-peak (based on 2002 best practice costs in the private bus sector in 
Sydney in a setting where the operator retains all fare revenue).  
 
The proportion of the total subsidy budget (TB) allocated to performance-based 
contracts in the regulator’s scheme is denoted by R, which permits variations in the 
                                                           
17 This percentage is derived from the percentage of RVKM complying with MSL’s for the illustrative 
operating context from which the data is extracted. 
Performance-Based Quality Contracts for the Bus Sector:  Delivering Social and Commercial Value 
for Money 
Hensher & Houghton 
9 
structure of the subsidy scheme between MSL and above-MSL (or PBC) components. 
Since TB is the pure-MSL subsidy requirement as determined by CSO, the MSL of a 
given scheme is defined by the associated R value as CSO*(1-R)18.  The inclusion of R 
is very important since it enables us to assess the implications of various mixes of MSL 
and PBC service levels.  
 
XMSL = (0.67)VKM (1-R) A MSLX X≥  (6) 
 
In addition to the fare cap and MSL constraints, government typically has a limited 
budget to allocate to subsidy support for bus transport. This subsidy cap is assumed to 
be a system-wide constraint within the metropolitan area and applies to all inner and 
outer metropolitan bus operators19. The subsidy cap is exogenously given but adjustable 
by government decree and has to fund the CSO payments as well as payments directly 
linked to incentives for growing patronage. The passenger-based incentive payment 
scheme at the heart of PBC’s is made up of gains in consumer surplus and externality 
benefits, where the latter are primarily linked to reductions in traffic congestion due to 
reductions in car VKMs (see section 3.5.2). For every additional passenger trip above 
predicted patronage based on RVKMMSL and associated fares, the operator has the 
opportunity to secure revenue from three sources: (i) the fare box (ii) the change in 
consumer surplus as a measure of user benefit and (iii) the change in externality cost 
from reduced car VKM. The last two revenue streams are referred to as incentive 
payments (above fare revenue) and are part of the total budget commitment to the 
system as a whole by government. After committing CSO payments the balance of the 
total subsidy budget is available for such incentive payments (constraint (6)). While this 
residual amount is fixed, the estimate of its dollar value per passenger trip of the 
consumer surplus benefit will be determined by the maximisation of the social surplus 
function subject to the set of constraints. The dollar unit values of reductions in car 
VKM are exogenously supplied based on studies of the environmental cost of car use 
(see Bus Industry Confederation 2001 and Sansom et al 2002). If additional passenger 
trip growth over the predicted amount per contract period is exceeded it cannot be 
funded out of the available incentive payments unless government revises its total 
subsidy budget. Nonetheless, all additional fare revenue will be accrued by the 
operators. 
 
3.3.3 Traffic and capacity  
 
In peak and off peak periods the road traffic in which buses operate is vastly different, 
and to achieve a given RVKM in dense traffic requires the deployment of more buses 
compared to light traffic conditions. A direct measure of bus-utilisation (ie traffic) 
intensity in the period is given by ( .# )
B
B
B
pers busZ
X
= . Z defines capacity required per 
RVKM as determined from the RVKM achieved by the number of buses (# buses) 
allocated to the period in the base case. An increase in base traffic results in a reduction 
                                                           
18 Specifically, R controls the structure of the contract scheme. Defining %PBC= (1-R), $CSO*(1-R) 
gives the MSL component of the subsidy; and hence the subsidy applied to the performance incentive is 
TB-CSO*(1-R); and the RVKM required to meet the (reduced) CSO is VKM*.67*(1-R). 
19 This cap can be applied to specific locations if that is more politically palatable. For Example, in the 
Sydney metropolitan area the government may choose to treat the government operator (the inner area 
supplier) differently to the private (outer area) operators. In addition, government may wish to pre-assign 
a cap to each operator (which we would recommend in the transition phase but not in post-transition 
growth phase). 
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in XB and an increase in Z, which has the effect of increasing the capacity required, 
XAZB, for a given solution XA. Z is not a control parameter but simply reflects the traffic 
of the period in the base case.  
 
Imposing equivalent traffic conditions in equivalent periods (peak, off-peak) to the base 
case requires 
 
A BZ Z=  , or,  
( .# )AA
B
pers busX
Z
=  (7) 
where   
 # bus = the number of buses assigned to the period/region and is 
assumed to reflect the demand levels of the base period and may be changed with 
corresponding cost implications. The capital cost of extra buses is fixed to # bus unless 
included with Z 
 
Pers = bus capacity (seating + standing) assumed to be single-valued and unchanging 
 
From (7) the capacity required for a given solution XA is given by A BX Z . 
 
The number of buses may be increased or decreased to provide an upper bound to XA 
that is fixed by the number of buses assigned to the period, i.e.  
 
( .# )AA
B
pers busX
Z
≤  (8) 
For a given #bus value, the bound may be loosened by deteriorating service quality, as 
discussed above. Again, the environment provided by the single stage solution is 
consistent with a profitable operator strategy to achieve the maximum social surplus, 
although it does not guarantee the optimum solution will be achieved.  
 
3.3.4 Service quality  
 
Service quality is maintained through the service quality constraint, which in its 
fundamental form requires  
 
YA/XA ≤ YB/XB.  (9) 
 
This becomes very restrictive for low X solutions, since with XA decreasing from XB 
towards XMSL, YA declines towards YMSL, given by *exp[ ( )]
X
MSL B A BY
BY Y X XX
ε
= − , more 
slowly than XA is declining. At low service levels, however, it is realistic to allow a 
decline in service quality to reflect an interaction between the declining returns and 
declining price elasticity of demand as the volume of business declines. In general, it is 
important to loosen the form of (9) through a control variable,κ, which relates to how 
full the buses are allowed to be on average given normal operating practices. κ is a 
measure of service quality with respect to loading and allows the service level to slip. 
The less restrictive form of (9) is given in (10) 
 
A A AY Z Xκ≤  (10) 
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The starting value of κ is 
B
B B
Y
X Z
κ =  which measures the base trip-rate per unit carrying 
capacity allocated. κ can be adjusted up or down to control an increase or decrease in 
acceptable bus crowding levels, thereby providing decreased or increased service 
quality (loading). Where increased κ is not associated with a reduced volume of 
business it should result in increased costs to reflect a loss of goodwill. Solutions 
incorporating increased values of κ will define an environment within which operators 
may make normal profits whilst providing high social surplus solutions. As in the 
previous section, optimum operator strategies may take the industry in different 
directions.  
 
3.3.5 System Wide Constraints 
 
There are two system-wide constraints associated with all regional activity.  
 
3.3.5.1 Subsidy cap 
 
First we have the total subsidy cap (11) in which the amount of subsidy available for 
passenger incentive payments is less than or equal to the total allocated subsidy budget 
minus commitments to CSO payments.  
 
( )4 4
region, period region, period
$ (1 )P CS EB TB CSO R+ ≤ − −∑ ∑ for (CS+EB)>0 (11) 
 
Constraint (11) states that the patronage incentive must be less than or equal to the 
subsidy budget above CSO payments for all operators for (CS+EB)>0. Performance-
based contracts allow subsidy payments to be earned whenever (CS+EB) are positive. 
Negative payments are not part of the performance-based system and are excluded in 
the modelling. Since both CS and EB are measured from the MSL position, payments 
are excluded when (CS+EB)<0. Although the total CS + EB is realised to the benefit of 
the community, the regulator can exercise the option to pay all of the benefit to the 
operator or only a proportion. P is the payout rate defining the proportion of external 
benefits accrued by bus companies on achieved (CS+EB). This is an important issue 
since the incentive payment focus does not suggest that 100% of the benefit must be 
paid to the operator. Indeed distribution of the full social benefit to the operator may not 
be equitable and/or financially feasible. What is critical however is that the payment 
distribution ensures sufficient incentive for the operator to improve service levels in 
order to grow patronage. 
 
3.3.5.2 Commercial requirements 
 
Total cost (including an acceptable return on investment) to all operators delivering bus 
services must be covered by all sources of revenue (12). The commercial constraint 
(equation 12) requiring that operator costs do not exceed revenues may be implemented 
when only commercially viable solutions are considered. 
 
( )4 4
region, period region, period
+ ( ) $ (1 )A AACCC qY P CS EB CSO R − + ≤ − ∑ ∑  … for (CS+EB)>0 (12) 
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3.4 Defining the Objective Function  
The demand and cost models together with the constraint set condition the maximum 
value of the social surplus objective function, given in (13)20.  
Max:   
4
region, period
(1 )( ) $ (1 ) ($ (1 ) ( ))A AACCP CS EB qY C CSO R CSO R P CS EB + + + − + − − − + + ∑  
 … for (CS+EB)>0  (13) 
 
CS is the consumer surplus and EB is the environmental benefit, where both of these are 
calculated from and above YMSL; all other variables are as defined previously. The 
measure of consumer surplus is relatively complex and influenced by changes in 
demand.  
 
3.5 Defining the Benefit Sources  
3.5.1 Consumer surplus 
 
The minimum service level, MSL, corresponds to the CSO, and is defined by a 
minimum RVKM, (XMSL) and maximum fare charged under MSL (typically the 
maximum permissible fare). The corresponding patronage level, YMSL, is established 
from (1). YMSL establishes the base patronage above which consumer surplus is 
generated given the current subsidy scheme. We let CS denote the level of consumer 
surplus associated with patronage determined by XMSL and maximum fares.  
 
A composite demand variable, G, is a function of both fare level and RVKM. GMSL is 
determined equivalently to YMSL. Quantity demanded is related to bus travel attributes, 
some of which are desirable to the consumer, like RVKM, and others which are 
undesirable, like price. These attributes may be combined in a composite attribute 
measure, G, where  
 
MSL MSL MSLG kq Xλ= + ;  A A AG kq Xλ= + ;  
( ) ( )MSL A MSL A MSL AG G k q q X Xλ− = − + − . (14) 
and  k = -1 
  λ = Community preparedness-to-pay for 1 km increase in X.   
 
Deriving lambda is a challenge given the absence of empirical studies. However 
additional service levels can be approximated by improved service frequency. The 
TRESIS project (Hensher 2002) provides a willingness to pay for improvements in 
service frequency of $2.66 per passenger trip hour. Given an average speed in the peak 
period of 24 kph and an off-peak average speed of 30 kph, we can convert the frequency 
valuation into $0.11 per RVKM in the peak and $0.0886 per RVKM in the off-peak for 
class (i) travelers. For class (ii) travellers the rates are halved.   
 
A corresponding composite demand function gives YA as a function of GA etc., and 
consumer surplus is then measured as (15). 
 
                                                           
20 Eqn (13) adds P(CS+EB) and $CSO(1-R) to the social surplus expression as they constitute part of the 
producers surplus, and then they are both subtracted since they sum to the scheme cost. 
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0.5* ( )( )* [( ) ( ), 1,1]A A MSL MSL MSL A A A MSL MSLACC S ACC S ACC S ACC SCS ABS Y Y Y Y G G if Y Y Y Y= + − − − + < + −
  (15) 
      (CS between YMSL, YA) 
         [( )*( ) 0,A A MSL MSL A MSLACC S ACC Sif Y Y Y Y G G+ + − − − <     
  ( )( )* [( ) ( ), 1,1],0]MSL MSL MSL A A A MSL MSLACC S ACC S ACC SY Y G G if Y Y Y Y+ − + < + −  
      (CS to axis if negative slope) 
 
Given that increases in fares reduce CS and increases in RVKM increase CS, we have to 
be careful how we treat the two impacts in the determination of changes in consumer 
surplus. Effective demand results from a balance between q and X.  For given parameter 
values, k and λ, the slope of the composite demand function will be positive or negative 
depending on solution values, qA and XA. When the slope is negative, as shown in 
Figure A, a consumer surplus, GAABGMSL, is derived from a reduction in the composite 
trip attribute from GMSL to GA.  But, when the slope is positive, as shown in Figure B, a 
consumer surplus, ABC, is derived from an increase in the composite trip attribute from 
GMSL to GA.  
 
 
In both Figures A and B, consumer surplus derives from ABC, but this is 
supplemented by the addition of (GMSL-GA)(YMSL) in Figure A. When YMSL is high and 
(YA-YMSL) = 0, the supplement will induce the optimization to choose a marginal 
difference between YA and YMSL in order to achieve a negative slope and accrue the 
supplement. In the programming, therefore, the supplement is accrued only for (YA-
YMSL) significantly different from zero.  
 
3.5.2 Environmental Externality Benefit 
 
The change in environmental benefits associated with car use is defined by equation 
(16). We assume initially that on average every car trip switched to a bus trip reduces 
car use by 10 kilometres and that 40% (20%) of all switched trips by adults (by school, 
GMSL 
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children) are from car21. Any transfer of car trips to bus trips reduces road traffic 
congestion and creates an environmental benefit which also contributes to social 
surplus. EB denotes the environmental benefit generated by solution trips above YMSL 
and is directly comparable to CS.  
 
EB = $/(↓car user)*(↑passengers from car)      … for each region, period  
      = ($/VKMcar)*(av VKMcar) *(↑passengers from car) 
      = ($/VKMcar)*(10KM)* ( )A A MSL MSLACC S ACC SY Y Y Y+ − −  *(shift factor car-bus) 
      = ($/VKMcar)*(10KM)* ( )A A MSL MSLACC S ACC SY Y Y Y+ − −  *0.4 (16) 
 
The unit rate of environmental benefit per VKM travelled by class (i) travellers, is a 
composite sum of six externalities, summarised in Table 1 for peak and off-peak and 
inner and outer metropolitan contexts. The evidence is drawn from the Bus Industry 
Confederation (2001) submission to the Commonwealth fuel tax inquiry. It is broadly 
consistent with the UK evidence reported in Sansom et al (2002).  
 
TABLE 1 Environmental Externality Costs per VKM 
 
Peak Period Inner Outer 
Road damage 0.2 0.2 
Congestion 90 60 
Air pollution 1 0.5 
Climate change 1.3 0.9 
Noise 0.4 0.3 
Accidents 0.8 0.8 
Total 93.7 62.7 
   
Off-Peak Period Inner Outer 
Road damage 0.2 0.2 
Congestion 16 16 
Air pollution 0.5 0.2 
Climate change 0.9 0.6 
Noise 0.3 0.1 
Accidents 0.8 0.8 
Total 18.7 17.7 
 
The patronage incentive is the sum of CS and EB (in dollars)22. Importantly, although 
school children travel for free in most jurisdictions and the operators are compensated 
through CSO payments, additional trips by children will attract an incentive payment 
through increased consumer surplus, and for car switchers, through increased externality 
benefit. On the latter calculation we may have to impose an additional assumption as to 
whether the school child’s bus use results in a reduction in car VKM or not, since some 
trips may continue. 
 
 
                                                           
21 This assumption can be refined by an assessment of source of switchers in the first monitoring period 
of if other evidence is available. 
22 EB may be negative if passenger trips fall and they switch to car, although we are not proposing to tax 
the operator. 
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4.  A Case Study for the Outer Metropolitan Area of 
Sydney 
 
The formal economic optimisation framework presented in section 3 has been tested on 
operators in the outer areas of the Sydney metropolitan area. Drawing on data collected 
in 2002 by the Institute of Transport Studies (ITS), in cooperation with 12 private bus 
operators23, we have extracted the relevant data for the model system. Importantly, the 
amount of data required from operators is relatively small and manageable for the 
regulatory task. Benchmark costs are those of the most cost efficient operator in the set 
(who is also the best operator on cost efficiency in the ongoing benchmarking program 
of ITS).  
 
Exogenous indicators such as elasticities, unit externality cost rates, willingness to pay 
parameters, minimum service level VKM etc are provided from non-operator sources 
and can be modified as new information becomes available. We have selected what are 
regarded as best-knowledge estimates in this case study to illustrate the feasibility and 
appeal of the analytical relationships used to establish appropriate incentive payments 
for performance-based contracts under a social surplus maximisation (or value for 
money) subsidy scheme. In the current paper we focus on the transition-phase of 
introducing PBCs and set the ‘optimal’ subsidy budget to the existing operator-specific 
level. In a follow-up paper, Hensher and Houghton (in progress) generalise the approach 
to optimise the total subsidy budget under a ‘growth after transition’ schema.  
 
The XMSL level is determined exogenously to accommodate the demographics of the 
region and availability of other modes. For this case study, XMSL is set for illustrative 
purposes to XMSL = 0.67 of VKM . The value of the pure MSL subsidy, $CSO, is based 
on $2.60/VKM (peak) and $2.30 (off-peak), which gives $CSO= $9,884,429. The 
subsidy budget of the illustrative cost-efficient operator is set to $CSO for the pure-
MSL strategy. The approach permits the entire range of contracts, from a pure-MSL to a 
pure-PBC and all mixes between. If the MSL component of the regulator’s subsidy 
scheme is reduced by R% of $CSO, then XMSL is reduced by R% of 0.67VKM and the 
subsidy budget allocated to PBC is the difference between TB and R% of $CSO. A 
subsidy scheme incorporating a mix of MSL and performance-based contracts, with a 
relatively large MSL component and a relatively small PB component, is likely to be a 
politically acceptable first step into a PB contract regime, and is a specific interest of 
this paper. In particular we consider optimizing the structure of the scheme (starting 
with the existing 0.67VKM base and R=0) to establish what mix of MSL and above-
MSL (ie performance based) service levels deliver a better value for money outcome 
than the baseline (ie current) MSL situation. An initial parity is established between 
alternative scheme mixes by holding RVKM, average fare, number of buses, patronage 
and costs fixed at the case B levels under what we refer to as the ‘calibration for parity’ 
(Section 4.1). We then allow RVKM, fares, fleet size, patronage and costs to change in 
the search for an improved solution (Section 4.2).  
 
                                                           
23 We used the data from 12 operators to confirm benchmark best cost practice and then used other data 
from this operator as if they were the system-wide provider. This paper does not assume anything about 
the optimum number of contract areas or operators. This issue is detailed in Hensher (2002b). 
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The seven model parameters are shown in Table 2. Four parameters are available to the 
regulator to define the subsidy scheme; and the operators as a group have four 
parameters to establish operator strategy within the environment of the defined scheme.  
 
Table 2:  Model parameters 
 
Parameter type Parameter 
Regulator parameters 
Operator parameters 
 P, R, RVKM(MSL), fare cap 
 q, RVKM, κ, #bus 
 
4.1. Calibration for Parity 
 
Under a mixed scheme, the difference between TB and R% of $CSO is available to 
distribute a return to the operators for the consumer benefits generated by Y>YMSL. For a 
given total subsidy budget the pure-PBC scheme may be calibrated to achieve parity 
with the pure-MSL scheme, in the sense that a payout rate on (CS+EB) exhausts the 
subsidy and the optimum “standard” operator strategy is the base case B, where 
standard strategies preclude changes to #bus, service quality and fares. The pure-MSL 
outcome is given in Table 3. No calibration is required for the pure-MSL scheme which 
is defined by current regulator rates. 
 
 
Table 3:  Model outcome for the pure-MSL scheme 
 
Model 
soln X q #bus used C        
Y         
(ACC+S)
CS   
(ACC+S)
EB           
(ACC+S)
Y(MSL)    
(ACC+S) X(MSL) Funding
Retn on 
cost
P-O 1,986,429 1.44 70 2,916,035 4,083,932 4,289,576 532,368 3,781,614 1,523,475 TB 9,884,429
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% CS+EB PAY 0
OP-O 3,358,000 1.52 36 13,048,221 2,794,325 2,253,562 259,467 2,412,741 2,575,389 FARES 6,291,216
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 13.44% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% CSO 9,884,429
TOTAL 5,344,429 1.51 70 15,964,256 6,878,257 6,543,138 791,835 6,194,356 4,098,864 less op COST 15,964,256
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.74% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% prod surp 211,389 1.32%
TB 9,884,429 CS+EB 7,334,972
Y         
(S)
CS          
(S)          
EB           
(S)          
Y(MSL)    
(S) SS 7,546,361
P 2,432,928 1,819,764 225,846 2,252,828 less SS Cost 9,884,429
0.000000% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% net SS -2,338,067 -23.65%
221,220 92,881 10,694 191,011 TB undist 0
0.000000% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% CB PS %PS SS %SS
2,654,148 1,912,645 236,540 2,443,839 7,334,972 211,389 1.32% 7,546,361 -23.65%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.09% 0.00% 0.00% 4.94% -13.18%
Y         
(ACC)     
CS          
(ACC)       
EB           
(ACC)        
Y(MSL)    
(ACC)
1,651,004 2,469,812 306,522 1,528,786
0.00% 3.70% 0.00% 0.00%
2,573,105 2,160,680 248,773 2,221,731
0.00% 14.09% 0.00% 0.00%
4,224,109 4,630,493 555,295 3,750,517
0.00% 8.31% 0.00% 0.00%
 
For a patronage level corresponding to the optimum standard RVKM under the pure-
PBC scheme, Table 4 shows that (CS+EB) exceeds the total budget by a substantial 
financial sum and cannot be paid in total to the operator. However, we can apply a non-
negative payout rate, P<1, to (CS+EB) to distribute the reduced sum to the operator and 
ensure there is no subsidy blowout. P will vary with the proportionate PBC component 
(R) in the scheme. A payout rate of P=9.334436% gives the case B outcome for the 
pure PBC scheme, as shown in Table 4.  
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But there are many mixed regulator strategies between Pure-MSL and pure-PBC. The 
5%-PBC regulator strategy includes a payout rate of P=5.086524%, and the model 
outcome is shown in Table 5. Tables 4 and 5 show that all aspects of peak and off peak 
operator strategies are unchanged for the optimum outcomes under the pure-and-mixed 
PBC regulator strategy. It is clear that a mixed PBC scheme can always be found that 
provides an environment within which current best practice will lead to operator 
outcomes equivalent to the pure-MSL scheme, as summarised in Table 6, which shows 
the totals/averages of the optimum standard strategy. The case B operational strategies 
(X, q) and associated outcomes (Y, C) are optimum for the case B fleet size (#bus) and 
service quality level, fare increases below 5%, and the specified (R, P) values.  
 
Table 4:  Model outcome for the pure-PBC scheme 
 
Model soln X q #bus used C        Y         (ACC+S) CS   (ACC+S)
EB           
(ACC+S)
Y(MSL)      
(ACC+S) X(MSL) Funding Retn on cost
P-O 1,986,429 1.44 70 2,916,035 4,083,932 69,885,636 2,021,391 2,936,036 0 TB 9,884,429
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1563.38% 279.70% -22.36% -100.00% CS+EB PAY 9,884,429
OP-O 3,358,000 1.52 36 13,048,221 2,794,325 33,096,947 888,108 1,488,235 0 FARES 6,291,216
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1565.98% 242.28% -38.32% -100.00% CSO 0
TOTAL 5,344,429 1.51 70 15,964,256 6,878,257 102,982,583 2,909,499 4,424,270 0 less op COST 15,964,256
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1564.22% 267.44% -28.58% -100.00% prod surp 211,389 1.32%
TB 9,884,429 CS+EB 105,892,082
Y         
(S)
CS          
(S)          
EB           
(S)          
Y(MSL)      
(S) SS 106,103,472
P 2,432,928 29,647,536 857,533 1,749,090 less SS Cost 9,884,429
9.334436% 0.00% 1529.20% 279.70% -22.36% net SS 96,219,043 973.44%
221,220 1,364,099 36,604 117,820 TB undist 0
9.334436% 0.00% 1368.65% 242.28% -38.32% CB PS %PS SS %SS
2,654,148 31,011,635 894,137 1,866,910 105,892,082 211,389 1.32% 106,103,472 973.44%
0.00% 1521.40% 278.01% -23.61% 1417.10% 0.00% 0.00% 1375.45% -3672.73%
Y         
(ACC)     
CS          
(ACC)        
EB           
(ACC)        
Y(MSL)      
(ACC)
1,651,004 40,238,100 1,163,858 1,186,946
0.00% 1589.50% 279.70% -22.36%
2,573,105 31,732,848 851,505 1,370,415
0.00% 1575.65% 242.28% -38.32%
4,224,109 71,970,948 2,015,362 2,557,361
0.00% 1583.37% 262.94% -31.81%
 
 
Table 5:  Model outcome for the 5%-PBC scheme 
 
Model 
soln X q #bus used C        
Y         
(ACC+S)
CS   
(ACC+S)
EB           
(ACC+S)
Y(MSL)    
(ACC+S) X(MSL) Funding
Retn on 
cost
P-O 1,986,429 1.44 70 2,916,035 4,083,932 5,781,122 616,106 3,734,061 1,447,301 TB 9,884,429
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 37.60% 15.73% -1.26% -5.00% CS+EB PAY 494,222
OP-O 3,358,000 1.52 36 13,048,221 2,794,325 3,020,438 298,627 2,355,151 2,446,620 FARES 6,291,216
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 52.04% 15.09% -2.39% -5.00% CSO 9,390,207
TOTAL 5,344,429 1.51 70 15,964,256 6,878,257 8,801,560 914,733 6,089,212 3,893,921 less op COST 15,964,256
change 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 42.23% 15.52% -1.70% -5.00% prod surp 211,389 1.32%
TB 9,884,429 CS+EB 9,716,293
Y         
(S)
CS          
(S)          
EB           
(S)          
Y(MSL)    
(S) SS 9,927,682
P 2,432,928 2,452,522 261,370 2,224,499 less SS Cost 9,884,429
5.086524% 0.00% 34.77% 15.73% -1.26% net SS 43,253 0.44%
221,220 124,488 12,308 186,452 TB undist 0
5.086524% 0.00% 34.03% 15.09% -2.39% CB PS %PS SS %SS
2,654,148 2,577,010 273,678 2,410,950 9,716,293 211,389 1.32% 9,927,682 0.44%
0.00% 34.74% 15.70% -1.35% 39.20% 0.00% 0.00% 38.05% -101.61%
Y         
(ACC)     
CS          
(ACC)       
EB           
(ACC)        
Y(MSL)    
(ACC)
1,651,004 3,328,601 354,736 1,509,562
0.00% 39.76% 15.73% -1.26%
2,573,105 2,895,950 286,319 2,168,700
0.00% 52.92% 15.09% -2.39%
4,224,109 6,224,550 641,055 3,678,262
0.00% 45.59% 15.44% -1.93%
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Table 6:  Optimum “standard” operator strategy for mixed PBC schemes 
 
X q #bus C Y (ACC+S) 
5,344,429 1.51 70 15,964,256 6,878,257
 
The summary scheme results for the pure schemes and mixed schemes up to 30%-PBC 
are shown in Table 7, where outcomes are totalled/averaged across periods. Outcomes 
for each regulator strategy specified by (R, P) pairs are shown in each row of the table, 
where the R value is clear from the first column and the P value is shown in the second 
column. The declining YMSL values from which consumer surplus and external benefits 
are computed for the specified schemes, are shown in column 4. Consumer surplus and 
external benefits, both of which generate operator income under PBC schemes, are 
shown in columns 5 and 6 as a proportion of patronage above YMSL.  As such, they show 
the unit incentive payment per passenger trip (above MSL patronage) from consumer 
surplus and external benefits respectively. These payments increase as the PBC 
component of the scheme increases, reflecting the decreasing value of YMSL (note that 
the EB unit rate is averaged across all patronage above MSL even though it is 
applicable only to car switchers). The producer surplus (PS) rate is equal to the case B 
rate of return (1.32%), referred to as the normal rate of return, and CB shows the total 
consumer benefit. Column 6 shows the SS level improving with CB, but these are not 
comparable across schemes due to varying YMSL. (This will be addressed later) 
 
Table 7:  Scheme results for mixed PBC schemes 
 
Scheme X(MSL) P PS CB SS %PS %SS
CS*P      
/(Y-YMSL)  
(ACC+S)
EB*P        
/(Y-YMSL)    
(ACC+S)
Y(MSL)         
(ACC+S)
Pure MSL 4,098,864 0.000000% 211,389 7,334,972 7,546,362 1.32% -23.65% 0.00 0.00 6,194,356
1%-PBC 4,057,875 1.269504% 211,389 7,786,067 7,997,457 1.32% -19.09% 0.13 0.01 6,173,167
5%-PBC 3,893,921 5.086524% 211,389 9,716,293 9,927,682 1.32% 0.44% 0.57 0.06 6,089,212
10%-PBC 3,688,977 7.966483% 211,389 12,407,521 12,618,911 1.32% 27.66% 1.02 0.09 5,986,042
20%-PBC 3,279,091 10.577781% 211,389 18,689,043 18,900,432 1.32% 91.21% 1.69 0.12 5,785,458
30%-PBC 2,869,205 11.352685% 211,389 26,120,066 26,331,456 1.32% 166.39% 2.17 0.13 5,592,292
Pure PBC 0 9.334436% 211,389 105,892,082 106,103,472 1.32% 973.44% 3.92 0.11 4,424,270
 
Through optimising SS, the model provides an environment, as specified by the 
regulator parameters, consistent with the resulting maximum returns for both the 
operators and the regulator. Table 7 has shown that, changing the proportion (R) of 
PBC in the subsidy scheme will always allow current best operator practice, with a 
given fleet size and service quality, to lead to operator outcomes equivalent to the pure-
MSL scheme, as given by the case B outcome. In this paper, service quality is 
controlled through constraint (10), which requires extra buses if the service level 
measured by RVKM is to be increased. In the next section, fleet size is added to the 
standard operator strategy parameters to assess the potential for market growth.   
 
4.2. Operator strategy  
 
To maintain community service obligations while pursuing the case B outcomes, the 
operator strategies (X,q) used above restricted fare changes to ≤5%, and precluded 
optimisation over fleet size and service quality (κ). In the above environment, 
reductions to RVKM are restricted by the MSL, and the maximum fare increase, and 
increases are restricted by the fleet size and minimum service quality levels. In this 
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section, the service quality level is maintained and #bus is added to the operator strategy 
parameters to allow market expansion. In this way we establish the gains for a 
benchmark operator by increasing the service level. The impact of unrestricted fare 
increases is also analysed. These operator strategies are analysed in the context of 
varying regulator parameter settings.  
 
4.2.1. Operator strategy: fleet size 
 
To assess the effectiveness of PBC schemes in providing an environment within which 
patronage may be commercially expanded, the operator strategy parameter dbus, which 
gives the increase in fleetsize, is applied to both peak and off-peak bus deployment. For 
each scheme ranging from 0%- to 100%-PBC we start from the calibrated scheme, with 
dbus=0, and establish the sensitivity of outcomes to increasing dbus.  
 
The optimum standard outcome for the 5%-PBC scheme is shown in Table 5. Under 
5%-PBC the return to the operator (PS) varies with increasing fleet size reaching a 
maximum of 6.7% when 3 buses are added to the fleet. This approximates the maximum 
return under all other PBC-schemes.  
 
A feature of the operator strategies for the 5%-PBC scheme is that increasing RVKM is 
associated with decreasing total patronage. This is explained by contrasting operator 
strategies between the peak and off-peak periods outcome, which is apparent from 
Table 8. In the peak period, the service level increases with increasing dbus up to 
dbus=3 and is stable thereafter. Fares increase by 5% when dbus=1 and are stable 
thereafter, Costs increase steadily over the range of increasing fleet size24. In the off-
peak period, the service level, patronage and costs decrease with increasing dbus up to 
dbus=3 and these are stable thereafter. Fares increase to the maximum when dbus=2 
and are stable at that level thereafter. The result of the different strategies for peak and 
off-peak periods is that as the fleet size increases over the range of 0≤dbus≤3, total 
RVKM, and patronage decrease and are stable thereafter; costs decrease over the same 
range and increase slowly thereafter. The reason for the diversity of strategies is that the 
limited TB is more profitably secured from the peak market until dbus=3, after which 
the peak and off-peak markets are both stable.  
 
Table 8:  Peak and off-peak operator strategies: R=5% 
dbus X(P) X(OP) X(TOT) q(P) q(OP) q(TOT) C(P) C(OP) C(TOT) Y(P) Y(OP) Y(TOT) %PS %SS
0 1,986,429 3,358,000 5,344,429 1.44 1.52 1.51 2,916,035 13,048,221 15,964,256 4,083,932 2,794,325 6,878,257 1.32% 0.44%
1 2,014,806 3,274,865 5,289,671 1.51 1.55 1.55 2,959,395 12,681,966 15,641,361 4,086,454 2,725,145 6,811,599 3.99% 4.61%
2 2,043,184 3,174,066 5,217,250 1.51 1.60 1.58 2,999,640 12,253,681 15,253,321 4,104,961 2,638,954 6,743,915 6.55% 8.41%
3 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,010,246 12,216,677 15,226,923 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.70% 8.62%
4 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,018,515 12,216,677 15,235,193 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.64% 8.53%
5 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,026,808 12,216,677 15,243,485 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.58% 8.45%
6 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,035,123 12,216,677 15,251,800 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.52% 8.37%
7 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,043,461 12,216,677 15,260,139 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.47% 8.28%
8 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,051,822 12,216,677 15,268,500 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.41% 8.20%
9 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,060,206 12,216,677 15,276,884 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.35% 8.11%
10 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,068,613 12,216,677 15,285,291 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.29% 8.03%
11 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,077,044 12,216,677 15,293,721 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.23% 7.94%
12 2,045,252 3,165,718 5,210,971 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,085,497 12,216,677 15,302,174 4,106,293 2,634,320 6,740,613 6.17% 7.86%
 
                                                           
24 Total cost in Table 8 is initially greater at dbus=0 then decreases before increasing beyond 3 buses. The 
reason for the initial decrease in C(TOT) as dbus increases is that X(OP) is decreasing fairly rapidly at 
that time and the cost function has (XA-XB) in the exponent. This is required to implement the trade-off 
of Y(OP) for Y(P) through a trade-off of the corresponding X’s. Also, the X(OP)/X(P) rate of exchange is 
very high due to the relatively low kappa (OP) compared to kappa (P), where kappa measures average bus 
loading rates. 
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Funds available for the PBC component of the 5%-PBC scheme are $494,222, and this 
is realised by bus operators as P*(CS+EB) where P is around 5.1%.  Based on the 
optimisations, the PBC payments are shown in Table 9 to reach a maximum, on 
average, of 68 cents per passenger trip.  
 
Table 9:  Incentive payments 
per trip:   R=5%. 
 
dbus
CS*P       
/(Y-YMSL)   
(ACC+S)
EB*P       
/(Y-YMSL)   
(ACC+S)
0 0.57 0.06
1 0.59 0.06
2 0.61 0.06
3 0.62 0.06
4 0.62 0.06
5 0.62 0.06
6 0.62 0.06
7 0.62 0.06
8 0.62 0.06
9 0.62 0.06
10 0.62 0.06
11 0.62 0.06
12 0.62 0.06  
 
Similar analyses apply to operator strategies for other regulator schemes. In all cases the 
maximum achievable return to operators is around 6.7%.   
 
Figure C shows that under 0%-PBC, SS is optimised by the operator maximising 
patronage in both peak and off-peak markets, by maximising RVKM and lowering fares 
to fill the buses available.  This socially optimum strategy, with growing negative 
operator returns associated with increasing social surplus, is not practicable – the 
optimum social surplus will never be achieved. The dominant feature of Figure C is 
that the producer surplus rate functions for the various mixed-PBC schemes are similar, 
showing very little sensitivity to scheme parameters. The PS functions differ primarily 
for dbus up to 3, where they are in reverse order of R, indicating an operator preference 
for 1%-PBC.  
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Figure C:  Operator Returns to Dbus for varying R (%PBC) 
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The contrasting behaviour between the pure-MSL and mixed-PBC schemes is the more 
interesting when related to the regulator surplus rate, as in Figures D-F. The model 
objective is to maximise the social surplus resulting from the regulator’s scheme and the 
social surplus moves monotonously with the regulators surplus rate. Figure D shows 
that the interests of the operator are not consistent with those of the regulator for the 
pure-MSL scheme, but in Figures E and F these interests are seen to be aligned under 
PBC schemes. The important conclusion is that if the operator were to optimise 
performance under a given PBC scheme, the outcome will approximate that of the 
model. Indeed, the optimum operator strategy under all PBC schemes is dbus=3 and the 
other strategy components X, and q are as in the optimum social surplus outcome for the 
dbus=3 case.  The significant conclusion, therefore, is that a mixed PBC scheme brings 
together the operator and regulator objectives, to provide approximately optimum social 
surplus outcomes.  
 
Figure D:  Operator and Societal Returns to Dbus for 0%PBC 
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Figure E:  Operator and Societal Returns to Dbus for 1%PBC 
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Figure :  Operator and Societal Returns to Dbus for 5%PBC 
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Outcomes for social surplus are greatly influenced by the different YMSL points25 for the 
alternative schemes and hence SS is not comparable across schemes. The schemes may 
be brought to comparability by adding to SS for each scheme, a single valued estimate 
of the consumer surplus below YMSL. These CS estimates are shown in Table 10. The 
result is to order the schemes’ SS performance in reverse order of R. Given that R=0% 
has no practical value, best outcomes are indicated by 1%-PBC.  Given the PS function 
as shown in Figure E, the optimum operator strategy is to increase the fleet size by two 
and implement the corresponding strategy as shown in Table 11. Incentive payments 
for 1%-PBC are shown in Table 12. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
25 As we change the value of R (or 1-R), the baseline patronage changes and makes all patronage above it 
eligible for an incentive payment (through the determination of CS + EB). 
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Table 10:  CS below YMSL Estimates 
 
R 0% 1% 5% 10% 20% 30% 100%
CS Below 
Y(MSL) 213,311,719 210,286,631 198,400,981 184,016,746 156,761,490 131,418,594 1,580,438  
 
 
Table 11:  Peak and off-peak operator strategies:   R=1% 
 
dbus X(P) X(OP) X(TOT) q(P) q(OP) q(TOT) C(P) C(OP) C(TOT) Y(P) Y(OP) Y(TOT) %PS %SS
0 1,986,429 3,358,000 5,344,429 1.44 1.52 1.51 2,916,035 13,048,221 15,964,256 4,083,932 2,794,325 6,878,257 1.32% -19.09%
1 2,014,806 3,277,713 5,292,519 1.51 1.60 1.58 2,959,395 12,723,770 15,683,165 4,086,454 2,695,163 6,781,617 4.09% -14.74%
2 2,043,184 3,167,667 5,210,851 1.51 1.60 1.58 2,999,640 12,225,303 15,224,943 4,104,961 2,635,403 6,740,364 6.72% -10.88%
3 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,008,409 12,216,677 15,225,087 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.71% -10.90%
4 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,016,674 12,216,677 15,233,351 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.65% -10.98%
5 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,024,962 12,216,677 15,241,639 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.59% -11.06%
6 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,033,272 12,216,677 15,249,949 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.53% -11.15%
7 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,041,605 12,216,677 15,258,282 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.48% -11.23%
8 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,049,961 12,216,677 15,266,638 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.42% -11.32%
9 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,058,340 12,216,677 15,275,017 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.36% -11.40%
10 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,066,742 12,216,677 15,283,419 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.30% -11.49%
11 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,075,167 12,216,677 15,291,844 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.24% -11.57%
12 2,043,646 3,165,718 5,209,365 1.51 1.60 1.58 3,083,615 12,216,677 15,300,292 4,105,259 2,634,320 6,739,579 6.18% -11.66%
 
 
Table 12:  Incentive payments per trip:  R=1% 
 
dbus
CS*P       
/(Y-YMSL)   
(ACC+S)
EB*P       
/(Y-YMSL)   
(ACC+S)
0 0.13 0.01
1 0.13 0.02
2 0.14 0.02
3 0.14 0.02
4 0.14 0.02
5 0.14 0.02
6 0.14 0.02
7 0.14 0.02
8 0.14 0.02
9 0.14 0.02
10 0.14 0.02
11 0.14 0.02
12 0.14 0.02  
 
 
4.3. Operator strategy: fare bounds 
 
In the above analysis, fares have been free of a lower bound, but an upper bound of 5% 
increase has been in place as described in the introduction to Section 2. An upper fare 
bound to 10% with schemes calibrated as in the 5% example gives very similar results, 
but the returns to operators are higher. Again, the operator return functions are similar 
across schemes and the preferred scheme is 1%-PBC. The operator strategies and 
incentive payments for 1%-PBC are shown in Table 13 and Table 14 respectively. The 
returns to fleet size, shown in Figure G, indicate a fleet size increase of 4, and the 
associated optimum strategy is shown in the corresponding row of Table 13.  
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Table 13:  Peak and off-peak operator strategies:  R=1%,  q(UB)=10% 
 
dbus X(P) X(OP) X(TOT) q(P) q(OP) q(TOT) C(P) C(OP) C(TOT) Y(P) Y(OP) Y(TOT) %PS %SS
0 1,986,429 3,358,000 5,344,429 1.44 1.52 1.51 2,916,035 13,048,221 15,964,256 4,083,932 2,794,325 6,878,257 1.32% -19.09%
1 2,014,806 3,292,858 5,307,664 1.59 1.67 1.66 2,963,186 12,844,858 15,808,044 4,070,113 2,647,894 6,718,007 4.53% -13.98%
2 2,043,184 3,182,920 5,226,104 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,003,501 12,340,729 15,344,230 4,088,547 2,589,783 6,678,330 7.19% -10.07%
3 2,071,562 3,051,104 5,122,665 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,044,465 11,765,347 14,809,812 4,106,556 2,516,475 6,623,031 10.37% -5.68%
4 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,071,521 11,389,015 14,460,536 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.53% -2.90%
5 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,079,959 11,389,015 14,468,974 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.46% -2.99%
6 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,088,420 11,389,015 14,477,435 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.40% -3.07%
7 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,096,905 11,389,015 14,485,920 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.33% -3.16%
8 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,105,413 11,389,015 14,494,428 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.26% -3.25%
9 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,113,944 11,389,015 14,502,959 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.20% -3.33%
10 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,122,499 11,389,015 14,511,514 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.13% -3.42%
11 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,131,077 11,389,015 14,520,092 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.07% -3.51%
12 2,087,558 2,960,873 5,048,431 1.59 1.67 1.66 3,139,679 11,389,015 14,528,694 4,116,526 2,463,860 6,580,385 12.00% -3.59%
 
 
Table 14:  Incentive payments per trip: R=1%,  q(UB)=10% 
 
dbus
CS*P       
/(Y-YMSL)   
(ACC+S)
EB*P       
/(Y-YMSL)   
(ACC+S)
0 0.13 0.01
1 0.13 0.02
2 0.14 0.02
3 0.15 0.02
4 0.16 0.02
5 0.16 0.02
6 0.16 0.02
7 0.16 0.02
8 0.16 0.02
9 0.16 0.02
10 0.16 0.02
11 0.16 0.02
12 0.16 0.02  
 
Figure G:  Returns to fleet size and social surplus:  R=1%,  q(UB)=10% 
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The approach taken in this paper has been to define a set of regulator schemes (R, P) where P 
calibrates the “standard” operator strategy under R, and to allow operators to optimise their strategy 
within that scheme. The advantage of the proposed approach is that it aligns the interests of operator 
and regulator for all non-standard strategies, so that the operator left to optimise corporate 
performance will be working in the social interest. It is possible to calibrate other strategies, but this 
alignment-of-interests property is then lost. 
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4.4 The Preferred Transition Position for Reform in the Outer 
Metropolitan Area of Sydney 
The previous sections present a large number of potential ‘solutions’. Although we have 
discussed the range of outcomes based on specific assumptions such as the mix of MSL 
and PBC components and resulting user and environmental externality benefits together 
with the rates of return to the operator and the subsidy allocation, it is appropriate to 
conclude with what might appear to be a good starting set of condition for the 
introduction of performance-based contracts. A practitioner’s guide to the recommended 
transition strategy is summarised in point form in Appendix A. 
 
Assuming that the regulator will require an MSL component to the delivery of services, 
we recommend that the CSO payment for MSL delivery should be based on $2.60 in the 
peak and $2.30 in the off-peak per vehicle kilometre. The establishment of the incentive 
payment rates is determined externally for the environmental benefits (respectively for 
outer urban operators of $0.627/car vkm for peak travel and $0.177/car vkm for off-
peak travel). The rate for user benefit (ie consumer surplus) per bus passenger trip is 
determined by the optimisation procedure, conditional on the proportion of the CSO to 
be implemented (1-R) and the incentive payout rate to the operators (P). Given a 
subsidy scheme defined as 1%-PBC with a payout rate of P=1.269504% and a total 
subsidy budget of TB=$9,884,429, if fares are bounded above by a 5% increase, the 
benchmark operator may be expected to increase fleet size by two buses for a return on 
operator investment (PS) of 6.7%, and the average user benefit per passenger incentive 
payment may be expected to be $0.14. This is additional to an average fare of $1.51 
(peak) and $1.60 (off-peak). If fares are bounded above by a 10% increase, the 
benchmark operator may be expected to increase the fleet size by 4 for a return on 
operator investment (PS) of 12.53%, and the average user benefit per passenger 
incentive payment may be expected to be $0.18. This is additional to an average fare of 
$1.59 (peak) and $1.67 (off-peak). The unit rate of incentive payment has been derived 
by averaging across all passenger trips above MSL even though the EB unit rate only 
applies to converted car VKM. The adoption of an average incentive payment per 
passenger trip above YMSL makes for a very simple administrative formula. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Performance-based contracts (PBCs) have emerged as a practical contracting regime 
with many virtues. Under a transparent partnership between the regulator and the 
service provider, a PBC offers a most effective way of delivering transport services, 
ensuring over time that the allocation of subsidy is determined optimally from a system-
wide perspective, not on an individual contract by individual contract basis (as would be 
required under other contracting regimes)26. In achieving system-wide optimisation, all 
                                                           
26 There is growing concern in England that concessionary fare subsidies are not matched by appropriate 
‘deliverable and measurable outputs’ (DLTR 2002). The Director-General of the Greater Manchester 
Passenger Transport Executive stated in a submission to the House of Commons Transport Select 
Committee’s inquiry on the bus industry that “We would like to reach a point where all the money paid to 
the bus industry is linked in some way to outputs’. The most interesting feature of the reform proposal is, 
over a 3-5 year period, to transfer some or all of the concessionary fares budget into a central pot. 
Operators would then be asked to come forward with proposals for delivering a network of commercial 
and supported services determined by the central authority and 10 metropolitan governments. This has 
been described as ‘voluntary quality contracts’ that push at the limits of quality partnerships but which is 
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parties should share the risks and rewards that quality partnerships can deliver (in 
contrast competitive tendering27 suggests a principal-agent relationship which is not as 
partnership compatible). 
 
The proposed system of subsidy which makes profit maximisation on the part of 
operators and social surplus maximisation coincide appears to offer a very 
attractive contract regime. Nash and Jansson (2002) in reviewing alternative 
reform schemes introduced over the last 15 years, conclude that “the regulatory 
phase could be better managed this time round, with an emphasis on 'light touch' 
regulation, perhaps combined with the appropriate use of subsidies per passenger 
kilometre and infrastructure charges to incentivise the franchisee to provide the 
socially optimum fares/service combination’. This is the intent of PBCs both in 
transition and post-transition. 
 
The method developed and implemented in this paper is sufficiently flexible to be 
applicable under a large number of regulatory and operating regimes. For example, it is 
feasible to consider alternative fare increase caps, different aggregate subsidy budget 
levels (be they increments of decrements on existing levels), variations in minimum-
service levels and incentive payment rates for environmental benefits, and acceptable 
commercial returns. The ability to recognise the full extent of consumer (ie user) surplus 
benefits to society and to determine the amount that might reasonable be paid to 
operators to ensure that the returns are incentive-compatible, without delivering 
unacceptable high rates of return on investment from the provision of public funds, is a 
very appealing feature of the approach.  
 
Looking ahead, it is important to keep in mind that the model developed herein is a 
model for the benchmark (in terms of cost efficiency) operator who begins from an 
optimum position. The model performance reflects this. Hence it is an appealing 
transition model. With the existing #bus the case B solution is optimum; and, as the 
fleet is expanded, improved "non-standard" strategies are found. These are, however, 
trade-off positions, typically involving an expansion in the peak period and a cut back in 
the off-peak period. The trade-off is required by the total subsidy budget and is 
consistent with PBC funding being essential for a benchmark operator's expansion.  
 
The approach of optimising within a given R, and calibrating to the "standard" strategy 
is fundamental to the specific PBC implementation strategy. First, SS comparisons 
across R are not made within the model (nor should they be); and second, calibrating to 
other strategies departs from the assumption of a benchmark operator, and also provides 
                                                                                                                                                                              
necessary to improve the increasingly poor quality of service levels of bus provision (which has evolved 
out of economic deregulation and competitive tendering of non-commercial services). 
27 Although competitive tendering of PBC’s is possible it must be based on a selection system that 
involves quality criteria rather than the conventional tendering processes (is the ‘lowest price wins’). 
Telemark County in southern Norway has recently adopted this model, although it is too early to see how 
it compares with PBC’s per se. The ability to optimise system-wide social surplus still remains a 
challenge however. In a recent review of competitive tendering in Adelaide and Perth, Bray (2002) in 
commenting on Hensher and Stanley (2002) statement ‘performance based contracts should deliver better 
long-term value for money to governments and consumers than the competitive tendering (CT) of bus 
contracts’ concludes that ‘they may well be correct’. He then asks a question: “If the CT process was run 
again in Perth and Adelaide would any further meaningful savings be achieved particularly when 
considering the enormous cost of the tendering process for regulators and operators?”. 
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schemes with competing operator-regulator interests. An unrestricted optimisation 
across R, P, X, q, and dbus will give the nonsense outcome: R=100%, P is calibrated to 
100% and %PS is large and negative.  
 
Hensher and Houghton (in progress) recognise that the PBC framework developed 
herein can be extended beyond the transition stage, to encourage growth from transition, 
and to establish the social surplus maximisation solution under an unconstrained total 
subsidy budget. This stage of growth after transition will consolidate the fuller extent of 
value for money under a PBC regime. The transition stage however is crucial in an 
environment where established operators have demonstrated (to varying degrees) the 
ability to deliver service quality. The transition to an incentive-compatible contract 
scheme should ensure greater gains to society in the future which may have been denied 
by the existing contract regime28. Future research will develop decision rules for 
applying the scheme in new regions.  
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Appendix A: A Summary of the Main Features of a 
Practical PBC Transitional Scheme for Sydney 
1. This appendix sets out the main elements of a PBC system introduced in a 
transition phase before moving to a fuller PBC scheme. In the transition phase 
we commit the government to the exact same level of financial support as 
currently received under each contract. The majority of this support is from the 
school subsidy transport scheme (SSTS) and concessional reimbursements. 
 
2. We call this total support TB (total subsidy budget). It will be imposed in the 
transition phase as an upper limit. The method developed in the body of the 
paper enables us to vary the TB upwards (or downwards) which will be 
desirable in the post-transition phase as government seeks out the best value for 
money solution. 
 
3. Maintaining the notion of a minimum service level (MSL), the first step is to 
identify the community service obligation ($CSO) payment in order to see what 
will be left over from TSB as an incentive payment (provided patronage is 
grown). (An important aside: any concern about an operator’s ability to survive 
without high CSO payments does not become an issue since the PBC scheme in 
the transition phase will support existing financial arrangements).  
 
4. Calculation of $CSO requires determination of the appropriate MSL. We will 
base it on existing levels as defined by RVKM (revenue vehicle kilometres). 
Given RVKM associated with MSL and average fare (as well as the existing 
ratio of seating capacity and RVKM (a proxy for service quality)), the PBC 
method uses a simple demand model to establish patronage levels associated 
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with MSL (see Section 3). We distinguish 'adults, children and concession' 
(ACC) from 'school children' (S), since the fare level does not apply in the 
latter's demand model. 
 
5. The resulting patronage is called YMSL. This patronage has a fare associated with 
it (if ACC) which is collected and kept by the operator in addition to the $CSO, 
the latter based on $/VKM multiplied by RVKMMSL. We are using benchmarked 
best practice costs ($2.60 for peak and $2.30 for off-peak) for private operators 
in Sydney. These unit costs could be varied if there is evidence to support an 
equity-adjusted cost efficient benchmark. (SSTS and all concessions 
reimbursements are no longer paid, which is a huge administration gain). 
 
6. The total revenue associated with $CSO plus YMSL patronage fares can be built 
on by attracting additional patronage (above YMSL). 
 
7. Given that we want to ensure that society gets value for money in the spending 
of TB, we need a way of calculating the maximum achievable social surplus. 
This involves recognising that the social surplus may well exceed TB and hence 
the operator should get only part of this social surplus.  
 
8. Because of different capabilities of operators to attract patronage (because of 
different operating environments) we need a way of ensuring some equity in 
establishing the incentive payment available. We do this by taking each 
operating area and running the social surplus (SS) maximisation model in which 
we hold $CSO fixed but allow VKM(RVKM) to increase above 
VKM(RVKM)MSL, fares to vary up or down with a 5% cap on fare increases, and 
fleet size to increase but holding service quality fixed (the latter defined by ratio 
of seating capacity and patronage, must not decline). 
 
9. This SS maximisation model (developed and detailed in the body of the paper) 
will enable us to identify the most likely achievable patronage growth (ie 
patronage above MSL level), some of which operators already have by 
providing better than MSL services.  
 
10. The additional patronage will pay fares (if ACC) or travel for free if they are 
school children (our model makes this distinction). Together with $CSO and 
fare revenue for MSL-level patronage, we can calculate the total fare and CSO 
payment revenue. The difference between TB and ($CSO plus all fare revenue) 
is the amount available as incentive payments to be paid out for the additional 
patronage. (Note: this is determined by our fixed TB).  
 
11. Under the fixed TB, all incentive payments would actually be distributed 
because they are achievable (ie passenger trips above YMSL are already being 
undertaken). However if TB were further increased, that money would not be 
automatically provided without additional patronage growth.(This latter growth 
is linked with what we refer to as ‘growth after transition’) But now we have an 
appropriate framework to ensure that each additional subsidy dollar delivers 
value for money. 
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12. When we compare all income sources to the total annual costs of running the 
business including an acceptable return on investment we should have operator 
balance.  
 
13. What we have is a contract system that has led to the removal of SSTS and 
concessional reimbursements and re-focused on incentives to grow patronage. 
Although the case study in the body of the paper imposes a budget limit based 
on the existing TB level, it is now possible for the government to increase TB 
but only return the increase to the operator if they grow patronage. We now have 
an incentive-compatible contract scheme for the first time. 
 
Appendix B: Partial withholding of fare revenue 
 
The model may be used to test a variety of scenarios, in the manner of the 10% fare cap 
in the text. In this appendix we consider an alternative scenario to assess the effect of a 
partial withholding of fare revenue. Here, the regulator withdraws from the operator, 
fare revenue generated by Y<YMSL. The motivation is the belief that operators are 
already paid at benchmark cost rates for X≤XMSL and fare revenue would repeat the 
payment. However, the fares are currently a part of the operator’s revenue, and the total 
subsidy budget (TB) has replaced the SSTS subsidy. On this basis, the benchmark 
operator has expanded the service level to its current level which exceeds XMSL by 50%. 
Clearly, if the service level is to be maintained, withdrawing the fare revenue as 
proposed will convert the current 1.32% rate of return into a serious loss.  
 
Outcomes are shown in Figure Z, where optimum rates of return across R for both the 
operator and the regulator are seen to be negative. Clearly, the scenario is impracticable.  
 
Figure Z:  OPTIMUM %PS AND %SS FOR SCENARIO 3 
 
%PS and %SS: scenario 3
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